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INTRODUCTION 
The Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 
(FDAAA) grants the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) authority to 
require a Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS) from drug 
manufacturers to ensure that a certain drug’s benefits outweigh its risks.1 
Through REMS, the FDA restricts the distribution of drugs with 
dangerous characteristics, such as high toxicities and severe side effects, 
to qualified medical professionals.2 Such restrictions limit the ability of 
generic drug manufacturers to obtain samples of the REMS-restricted 
drugs for bioequivalence testing for an Abbreviated New Drug 
Application (ANDA).3 Without the ability to demonstrate 
bioequivalence in the ANDAs, potential generic entrants are unable to 
obtain FDA approval of drugs that would eventually compete with the 
REMS drugs.4 Recently, potential generic entrants have attempted to use 
the antitrust laws to force manufacturers of REMS-restricted drugs to 
provide them with samples.5 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has 
weighed in on behalf of generic entry.6 
The FTC’s recent actions are consistent with its long-standing policy 
concern regarding restrictions that limit generic drug competition. The 
FTC’s actions demonstrate its belief that generic entry in the 
pharmaceutical market will create positive consumer welfare effects.7 
The consumer welfare effects of such generic competition, however, are 
more complex than merely lowered prices. Indeed, the FTC has 
downplayed evidence that generic entry restricts drug utilization, chills 
industry investment, and may have unintended health and safety 
consequences.8 Yet, the FTC has continued unabatedly down the path to 
                                                                                                                    
 1. SUSAN THAUL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41983, HOW FDA APPROVES DRUGS AND 
REGULATES THEIR SAFETY AND EFFECTIVENESS 15–16 (2012). 
 2. Id. 
 3. David Rodi & Zach Hughes, Are Branded Manufacturers Obligated to Sell Their 
Drugs to Generic Manufacturers So They Can Make Copies?, BAKER BOTTS LLP (Feb. 
28, 2012), http://www.bakerbotts.com/file_upload/Update_2012_02LifeSciencesNewsletter 
BrandedManufacturers.htm. 
 4. See id. 
 5. See, e.g., Complaint at 4, Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Celgene Corp., No. 2:14-CV-2094 
(D.N.J. Apr. 3, 2014) [hereinafter Mylan Complaint]; Complaint for Declaratory Judgment at 7–
8, Actelion Pharm. Ltd. v. Apotex Inc., No. 1:12-cv-05743-NLH-AMD (D.N.J. Sept. 14, 2012) 
[hereinafter Actelion Complaint]. 
 6. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n Brief as Amicus Curiae at 2, Mylan, No. 2:14-CV-2094-
ES-MAH, available at http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/amicus_briefs/mylan-
pharmaceuticals-inc.v.celgene-corporation/140617celgeneamicusbrief.pdf  [hereinafter FTC 
Mylan Brief]; Fed. Trade Comm’n Brief as Amicus Curiae at 2, Actelion, No. 1:12-cv-05743-
NLH-AMD [hereinafter FTC Actelion Brief].  
 7. Mylan Complaint, supra note 5, at 2–3; Actelion Complaint, supra note 5, at 1–2. 
 8. See Tracy Lewis et. al., Does Generic Entry Always Increase Consumer Welfare?, 
3
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generic drug nirvana, asserting that new entry by generics produces 
unambiguously positive effects for consumers. 
The FTC’s recent intervention on behalf of generic manufacturers 
that attempt to use federal antitrust laws to gain access to REMS-
restricted drugs overlaps with the FDA’s direct oversight of REMS-
restricted drugs. So long as original-brand manufacturing companies 
(brand manufacturers) have unanswered questions related to their 
liability for the actions of generic companies, they are unwilling to 
provide potential competitors with product samples, as there is no valid 
business justification to give up those samples.9 Rather, REMS-
restricted drug makers have many valid business justifications for their 
refusal to deal with a potential generic manufacturer. This ongoing 
dispute has spurred private litigation and an FTC investigation.10 In two 
private litigation cases, the FTC filed amicus briefs claiming that the 
antitrust claims under section 2 of the Sherman Act are cognizable and 
that the court should determine the merits of the claim.11 To date, no 
court has addressed the merits of these antitrust claims and details of the 
FTC’s investigation are unclear.12  
This Article provides an antitrust and economic analysis of a refusal-
to-deal claim in the REMS context. The analysis suggests that the 
antitrust claims involved do not provide a proper justification for a new 
exception to a competitor’s right to refuse to deal. The FDA and 
Congress play important roles in the complex regulatory scheme of the 
U.S. pharmaceutical industry. With so much regulation and oversight, 
antitrust has little place in ensuring an efficiently functioning market for 
REMS-restricted pharmaceuticals.  
Part I provides background about generic drug entry under the Hatch–
Waxman Act, which lays out the framework for ANDAs, and discusses 
REMS-restricted drugs under the FDAAA. This Part also details current 
antitrust litigation stemming from refusal to deal in the REMS context, 
as well as the FTC’s position on such conduct. Part II summarizes the 
antitrust refusal-to-deal doctrine under section 2 of the Sherman Act by 
                                                                                                                    
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 373, 381 (2012); Laura E. Panattoni, The Effect of Paragraph IV Decisions 
and Generic Entry Before Patent Expiration on Brand Pharmaceutical Firms, 30 J. HEALTH 
ECON. 126, 144 (2011); Rodi & Hughes, supra note 3. 
 9. See, e.g., Rodi & Hughes, supra note 3 (noting a warning that giving samples “to 
generic manufacturers would impose undue . . . risks on [an] innovator company”). 
 10. FTC Mylan Brief, supra note 6, at 2; FTC Actelion Brief, supra note 6, at 3. 
 11. FTC Mylan Brief, supra note 6, at 8; FTC Actelion Brief, supra note 6, at 8. 
 12. See Kurt R. Karst, Decision in Lannett THALOMID Bioequivalence Study Sample 
Antitrust Lawsuit Could Reignite Debate on Generic Drug Availability and REMS Restrictions, 
FDA LAW BLOG (Apr. 3, 2011, 10:21 PM), http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_
phelps/2011/04/decision-in-lannett-thalomid-bioequivalence-study-sample-antitrust-lawsuit-
could-reignite-debate-on-.html [hereinafter Karst, Decision in Lannett]; Rodi & Zach Hughes, 
supra note 3. 
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analyzing prior U.S. Supreme Court precedent. This Part then argues that 
refusal-to-deal claims in the REMS context fail under current refusal-to-
deal jurisprudence. Part III argues that given the error costs associated 
with antitrust or agency intervention, such intervention would be 
contrary to public policy. Part IV suggests a narrow antitrust framework 
to analyze refusal to deal in the REMS context if the courts determine 
that antitrust analysis is appropriate. If the refusal to provide samples of 
REMS-restricted drugs to competitors does receive antitrust scrutiny, it 
should be evaluated under the profit-sacrifice test. Analysis under other 
theories of antitrust liability would be imprudent.  
I.  GENERIC DRUG APPLICATIONS, REMS-RESTRICTED DRUGS, AND 
ANTITRUST CLAIMS 
The Hatch–Waxman Act provides an avenue and incentive for 
generic drug manufacturers to develop competitor drugs to brand-name 
drugs and enter the pharmaceutical market.13 This Part begins by 
detailing how the Hatch–Waxman Act incentivizes generic entry. The 
Part then outlines the complications that arise when generic drug 
manufacturers seek to develop generics for REMS-restricted drugs. 
Finally, it explains the antitrust claims by some generic drug 
manufacturers and the FTC regarding refusal-to-deal conduct in the 
REMS context. 
A.  The Hatch–Waxman Act Enhances Generic Entry 
The Hatch–Waxman Act lays out the regulatory structure for 
pharmaceutical patent protection and the development of generic 
alternatives to brand-name drugs.14 Congress created the Hatch–
Waxman Act as a mechanism to accelerate the entry of lower cost 
generic drugs into the pharmaceutical market,15 and it has certainly had 
that effect.16 The Hatch–Waxman Act allows FDA approval of generic 
versions of drugs through an ANDA, which is markedly cheaper and 
quicker than the approval of the original brand-name drugs through a 
New Drug Application (NDA).17 Approval of generic versions of drugs 
                                                                                                                    
 13. The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012)). 
 14. Id. 
 15. See id.; FTC Actelion Brief, supra note 6, at 5. 
 16. Roxane, a generic drug manufacturer, points to an IMS Health Study from 2009 finding 
that generic prescription drugs saved the U.S. health care system more than $800 billion from 
2000 to 2009. Roxane Laboratories, Inc.’s Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaim 
Complaint at 28, Actelion Pharm. Ltd. v. Apotex Inc., No. 1:12-cv-05743-NLH-AMD (D.N.J. 
Nov. 27, 2012) [hereinafter Roxane Counterclaim]. 
 17. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2), (j). 
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requires only a showing of bioequivalence,18 which is considered an AB 
rating if the generic “contains the same active pharmaceutical ingredient 
as the brand-name drug, [has] the same dosage and form, and exhibits a 
similar . . . absorption.”19  
This process of generic drug approval ensures that these 
pharmaceuticals “share the same safety and efficacy profile as their 
brand counterparts.”20 In return for the heightened generic competition, 
brand manufacturers receive a longer patent term.21 The Hatch–Waxman 
Act also makes it easier for generic manufacturers to declare their 
intention to enter a market—even when a brand-name drug is covered 
by a patent—merely by filing a certification claiming that the patent is 
invalid or the generic version is non-infringing (this is known as a 
paragraph IV certification).22 The Hatch–Waxman Act thus places the 
onus of protecting the patent on the patent holder.  
B.  REMS-Restricted Drugs Under the FDA Amendments Act  
Under the FDAAA, REMS restrictions protect patients by limiting 
the distribution of dangerous drugs and ensuring that certain safety 
standards regulate their use.23 REMSs represent a very visible regulatory 
scheme designed to have a measured and incrementally increasing list of 
safety restrictions to ensure a uniform approach to concerns over drugs 
that have already been approved by the FDA and released for public 
use.24 The FDAAA gives the FDA authority to require REMSs for new 
and previously approved drugs “to ensure the benefits . . . outweigh the 
risks of the drug.”25 
The system is designed to create a more uniform approach to potential 
side effects and health risks posed by already released drugs.26 The FDA 
is now tasked with determining if each newly released drug should be 
accompanied by one of many different kinds of REMSs.27 These 
restrictions are designed to ensure the safe administration of drugs to 
healthcare practitioners and patients, as well as provide more detailed 
                                                                                                                    
 18. See id. § 355(j)(8). 
 19. FTC Actelion Brief, supra note 6, at 3–4.  
 20. FTC Actelion Brief, supra note 6, at 4.  
 21. The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417, 98 Stat. 1598 (1984) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2012)). 
 22. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(ii), (j)(5)(F)(ii). 
 23. R. William Soller & Eleanor M. Vogt, The REMS Primer: Understanding the 
Strategies for Risk Management, MEDSCAPE EDUCATION FAMILY MEDICINE (Dec. 28, 2010), 
http://www.medscape.org/viewarticle/734712. 
 24. Id.  
 25. See Roxane Counterclaim, supra note 16, at 27. 
 26. See Soller & Vogt, supra note 23. 
 27. Id.  
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and comprehensive data for post-marketing studies of rare but serious 
side effects or reactions.28 The REMS restrictions are specific to 
individual drugs, and no two REMS programs are necessarily alike.29 
REMS restrictions may include any of the following categories: “a 
medication guide or patient package-insert requirement, a 
communication plan, . . . [a] timetable for sponsor submission to FDA 
of an assessment on the impact of a REMS program,” or detailed 
“elements to assure safe use (ETASU).”30  
REMS restrictions can significantly curtail a drug’s availability 
because REMS-restricted drugs are only available for purchase from the 
manufacturer rather than through normal distribution channels, such as 
wholesalers.31 REMS restrictions can result in similar availability issues 
for generic manufacturers that require testable samples in order to 
produce bioequivalent drugs.32 Even those REMS-restricted drugs that 
are sold by distributors are often subject to restrictive agreements that 
further limit a generic manufacturer’s ability to access samples.33  
The regulatory regime established by the FDAAA does not explicitly 
require brand manufacturers to provide product samples to generic 
manufacturers.34 Congress did consider draft language creating this 
obligation, but did not include it in the final version of the amendment.35 
                                                                                                                    
 28. FDA Basics Webinar: A Brief Overview of Risk Evaluation & Mitigation Strategies 
(REMS), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/
ucm325201.htm (last visited May 1, 2015). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Soller & Vogt, supra note 23. For instance, a REMS restriction for a drug that could 
cause birth defects might require a negative pregnancy test before the drug could be prescribed. 
 31. See Roxane Counterclaim, supra note 16, at 22. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See, e.g., id. A related issue involves the patenting of a REMS plan. Patented REMS 
plans can be listed with the FDA’s “Orange Book” and can substantially extend the life of an 
already-patented drug. Laura S. Shores, Pharmaceutical Patent Life Extension Strategies: Are 
REMS Programs Next?, PEPPER HAMILTON LLP (Mar. 28, 2012), http://www.pepperlaw.com/
publications_article.aspx?ArticleKey=2335. Another hurdle created by REMS patents is that 
their administration can be labor intensive. Celgene Corporation patented a distribution program 
called S.T.E.P.S. for the drug Thalomid that requires 175 employees to implement. Id. The 
difficulty in administration could exclude the majority of smaller generic manufacturers. 
Although not a part of the current disputes over refusals to provide samples, this conduct is a 
likely candidate for future disputes and possible enforcement actions by the FTC. These patents 
can be challenged similarly to brand-name pharmaceuticals by filing “Paragraph IV 
certifications.” Id. 
 34. Rodi & Hughes, supra note 3. 
 35. Kurt R. Karst, Actelion Preemptively Sues Generic Companies over REMS and Biostudy 
Product Availability Issues; Case Could Be a Bellwether for Future Efforts, FDA LAW BLOG (Oct. 
9, 2012), http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2012/10/ actelion-preemptively-
sues-generic-companies-over-rems-and-biostudy-product-availability-issues-case.html [hereinafter 
Karst, Actelion Preemptively Sues]. 
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Congress even had a second opportunity to include this language in 2012 
when it passed the FDA Safety and Innovation Act (FDASIA), and again 
chose not to make sharing drug samples mandatory.36 Current regulatory 
law does include an ambiguous statement that brand manufacturers 
should not use ETASU “to block or delay approval of an [ANDA].”37 
The interpretation of this requirement will be up to the courts, but it 
seems to fall far short of imposing an obligation on brand manufacturers 
to deal with their rivals.38 
The FDA has been slow to clarify its stance on whether brand 
manufacturers should have a duty to deal with potential generic 
competitors, but it has included language in REMS approval letters 
reiterating that brand manufacturers cannot use ETASU “to block or 
delay approval of an [ANDA].”39 The FDA has referred generic 
manufacturers’ complaints about the anticompetitive effects of these 
refusals to the FTC.40 
The overall regulatory problem in these cases is the result of 
unresolved interest-group battles between generic and brand 
manufacturing companies.41 A promising compromise would have 
imposed a statutory obligation for brand manufacturers to provide 
samples of their drugs for bioequivalency testing, and in return, would 
have given them protection from liability for any mistakes, adverse 
events, or harmful payments that could arise from use of the samples or 
the resulting generic products.42 However, such a compromise collapsed, 
                                                                                                                    
 36. The original draft of the FDASIA stated that “if a drug is a covered drug, no elements 
to ensure safe use shall prohibit, or be construed or applied to prohibit, supply of such drug to 
any eligible drug developer for the purpose of conducting testing necessary to support an 
application under [FDC Act § (b)(2) or § 505(j) or PHS Act § 351(k)].” Id.; Food and Drug 
Administration Safety and Innovation Act, S. 3187, 112th Cong. § 1131 (2012); 158 Cong. Rec. 
S3371 (2012). 
 37. 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(f)(8) (2012). 
 38. Karst, Actelion Preemptively Sues, supra note 35. 
 39. See, e.g., Letter from Judith A. Racoosin, Deputy Dir. for Safety, Ctr. for Drug 
Evaluation & Research, to Beth Connelly, Assoc. Dir. Regulatory Affairs, Purdue Pharma L.P. 
(Apr. 15, 2013) available at http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/appletter/2013/ 
019516Orig1s038ltr.pdf. 
 40. See Letter from Janet Woodcock, Dir., Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, to Kumar 
Sekar, Dr. Reddy’s Labs., Inc. (Aug. 7, 2013), available at http://www.fdalawyersblog.com/
FDA_CDER_to_Dr_Reddys_Laboratories_Inc_Partial_Petition_Approval_and_Denial.pdf. 
 41. Merrill Goozner, Rx Firms Use Safety Scare Tactics to Thwart Generics, THE FISCAL 
TIMES (June 15, 2012), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2012/06/15/RX-Firms-Use-
Safety-Scare-Tactics-to-Thwart-Generics#sthash.xJG8jjG5.dpuf (“Efforts to close the 
loophole,” which allows brand manufactures to avoid giving REMS-restricted drug samples to 
generic manufacturers, “have become the subject of a fierce behind-the-scenes lobbying 
campaign on rival bills that reauthorize industry user fees”). 
 42. See Goozner, supra note 41. 
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and the resulting regulatory scheme and brand manufacturers’ liability 
issues remain unclear and muddled.  
C.  REMS Antitrust Claims 
After the FDAAA became law in 2007, conflicts over the 
implementation of REMSs started almost immediately. Brand 
manufacturers began refusing to provide samples of brand-name drugs 
to generic manufacturers, who previously had access to these drugs for 
the bioequivalence testing required for the development of generic 
alternatives under the Hatch–Waxman Act.43 Despite formal requests, 
protests, demands, and threats of litigation, brand manufacturers have 
asserted their right to refuse to sell their patented drugs to generic 
manufacturers while the generic manufacturers have complained of both 
regulatory and antitrust violations.44 The FTC is conducting at least one 
investigation into the practice, and three high-profile cases deserve 
closer analysis.45  
1.  Lannett Co. v. Celgene Corp.  
In 2008, Lannett Co. (Lannett), a generic manufacturer, sued Celgene 
Corp. (Celgene), a brand manufacturer46 in Lannett Co. v. Celgene 
Corp.47 Lannett alleged that Celgene was restricting Lannett’s access to 
the drug Thalomid (thalidomide), which is subject to some of the strictest 
REMS restrictions, to prevent bioequivalence testing for a proposed 
ANDA.48 
Celgene asserted that it would not consider providing the drug 
samples until it received proof from the study’s sponsor or the FDA that 
                                                                                                                    
 43. See FTC Mylan Brief, supra note 6, at 3–4; FTC Actelion Brief, supra note 6, at 3–4. 
 44. See, e.g., FTC Mylan Brief, supra note 6, at 14; FTC Actelion Brief, supra note 6, at 
15. 
 45. Similar conduct has arisen in other cases. For example, Acorda Therapeutics has 
refused to sell samples of the brand-name drug Ampyra. Contention in Making Generic Drugs, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/04/15/business/ 
Contention-in-Making-Generic-Drugs.html. Ampyra is administered to improve walking in 
patients suffering from multiple sclerosis and had sales of over $250 million in the United States 
in 2012. Id. Accord Healthcare, a generic manufacturer, has sued in federal court with claims 
similar to those in Actelion and Lannett. Katie Thomas, Drug Makers Use Safety Rule to Block 
Generics, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/16/business/drug-
makers-use-safety-rule-to-block-generics.html [hereinafter Thomas, Drug Makers Use Safety]. 
Another brand manufacturer, Lundbeck, has refused to sell drug samples of Xenazine, a drug 
used to treat a movement disorder caused by Huntington’s disease, to Apotex. Id. Lundbeck 
claims that it is waiting for the FDA’s guidance. Id. 
 46. Rodi & Hughes, supra note 3. 
 47. Lannett Co. v. Celgene Corp., No. 08-3920, 2011 WL 1193912 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 
2011). 
 48. Id. at *1; Karst, Decision in Lannett, supra note 12; Rodi & Hughes, supra note 3. 
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the study would comply with the REMS requirements and would not 
jeopardize the test subjects’ safety.49 The court initially dismissed the 
complaint on “ripeness grounds” because the study had not yet received 
approval from the FDA.50 Lannett then received FDA approval and 
refiled the case; the court denied Celgene’s subsequent motion to 
dismiss.51 Before the merits of the antitrust and regulatory claims were 
decided, the parties initially settled with a confidential agreement.52  
The FDA did not take a strong enough position to quell the ensuing 
litigation.53 The FDA filed a letter stating that Lannett could access the 
necessary drugs once the company received approval for its 
bioequivalence study, but the FDA did not require Celgene to provide 
the requested samples.54 The Lannett case represents the first time the 
FTC became actively involved in an investigation of this type of 
behavior, but the result of the investigation is unknown.55 
2.  Actelion Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Apotex Inc.  
In Actelion Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc.,56 Actelion 
Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (Actelion), a brand manufacturer, refused to 
provide generic manufacturers with samples of the REMS-restricted 
drugs Tracleer (generic name bosentan) and Zavesca (generic name 
miglustat).57Actelion argued that its position was consistent with both 
the REMS regulatory requirements and its own assertion that the 
company lacked any statutory or legal obligation to deal with potential 
                                                                                                                    
 49. Lannett, 2011 WL 1193912, at *1; Karst, Decision in Lannett, supra note 12. 
 50. Karst, Decision in Lannett, supra note 12. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Erin Coe, Lannett Cuts Deal with Celgene in Thalomid Antitrust Case, LAW360 (Dec. 
7, 2011, 2:47 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/291483/lannett-cuts-deal-with-celgene-in-
thalomid-antitrust-case; see also Lannett, 2011 WL 1193912, at *3. 
 53. See Letter from Janet Woodcock, supra note 40 (noting that the FDA: (1) agreed that 
it should clarify the relationship between bioequivalence studies and REMS; (2) recognized that 
many bioequivalence tests do not violate REMS; (3) declined to add into the REMS a 
requirement to provide samples to generics; and (4) agreed that it will refer some cases to the 
FTC or open its own investigation if there are competitive concerns).  
 54. Rodi & Hughes, supra note 3. 
 55. Id. Note that Celgene’s SEC filings from 2009 to 2012 state that it received two civil 
investigation demands from the FTC so the current status of this investigation is unclear. Id. 
 56. No. 1:12-cv-05743-NLH-AMD (D.N.J. Sept. 14, 2012). 
 57. Actelion Complaint, supra note 5, at 2; Kurt R. Karst, Actelion’s Preemptive Strike 
over REMS and Biostudy Product Availability Draws Antitrust Counterclaims, Another Drug, 
and Another Company into the Mix, FDA LAW BLOG (Dec. 5, 2012, 5:57 PM), 
http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2012/12/actelions-preemptive-strike-
over-rems-and-biostudy-product-availability-draws-antitrust-counterclaim.html [hereinafter 
Karst, Actelion’s Preemptive Strike]. 
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competitors.58 Actelion claimed that the REMS restrictions only allowed 
Tracleer to “be dispensed through pharmacies, practitioners, and health 
care settings that [were] specially certified and bound by contract to 
follow a strict protocol to monitor and protect patient health.”59 The 
restrictions further require 
monthly follow-up[s] with patients to ensure that liver 
function testing and pregnancy testing have been 
completed; that only a limited supply of Tracleer can be 
distributed at a time; that Tracleer can only be dispensed to 
patients who are enrolled in the REMS program; and that 
certain defined patient counseling is completed regularly.60 
Actelion’s actions prevented generic manufacturers Roxane 
Laboratories Inc. (Roxane) and Apotex Inc. (Apotex) from moving 
forward with ANDAs for generic versions of Tracleer and Zavesca. 61 As 
a result, Actelion was able to delay the development and entry of generic 
versions into the market, which may prevent price-lowering competition 
and access to cheaper versions of these two drugs for consumers.62 
Actelion pointed to the REMS restrictions associated with the serious 
side effects of Tracleer as a justification for limiting distribution to its 
competitors.63 Side effects for the use of Tracleer include serious liver 
damage, liver failure, and birth defects if taken during pregnancy.64 
Apotex sent letters to Actelion making clear its intention to begin an 
ANDA filing for a generic form of Tracleer.65 Actelion responded with 
a formal denial, asserting its right to refuse to deal with a rival.66 The 
same denial indicated that the REMS requirements prevented release of 
any samples without proof that Apotex’s bioequivalence study protocol, 
required under the Hatch–Waxman Act to develop a generic 
pharmaceutical, complied with the REMS requirements.67 
  
                                                                                                                    
 58. Actelion Complaint, supra note 5, at 2–3. 
 59. Id. at 6. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Karst, Actelion’s Preemptive Strike, supra note 57. One interesting twist in the case 
was that Apotex managed to procure a Canadian version of the drug for bioequivalence testing, 
but the FDA denied the use of this sample in a correspondence claiming that Apotex could only 
use “the approved US product as the reference product” and that the Canadian version was “not 
acceptable to use.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 62. See id. 
 63. Actelion Complaint, supra note 5, at 6. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 7. 
 66. Id. at 10. 
 67. Id. at 9–10, 13–14. 
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Roxane similarly made multiple attempts to purchase the samples and 
was met with refusals.68 It also received similar responses from 
Actelion’s U.S. supplier, CuraScript.69 On November 9, 2011, Actelion 
sent Roxane a definitive notification that it asserted a right to choose 
with whom it would deal and that it would not sell samples to Roxane.70 
Roxane then contended that the REMS restrictions were being used to 
“block or delay approval” of ANDAs in contravention of the FDA’s anti-
gaming provisions.71 Roxane continued that Actelion’s responses were 
“nothing more than an anticompetitive scheme calculated to delay 
generic competition as long as possible.”72 In response, Actelion asserted 
that declining to provide samples of its drugs fit squarely within its right 
to refuse to deal with actual or potential rivals.73 Actelion’s position was 
that it maintained proprietary control over its own patented drugs and 
owed no legal or regulatory obligation to provide samples to generic 
manufacturers.74  
Eventually, Actelion filed for declaratory judgment in the U.S. 
District Court for the District of New Jersey, seeking a court order 
affirming its right to refuse to deal with any potential rivals.75 Both 
Apotex and Roxane brought counterclaims asserting that Actelion 
violated the New Jersey Antitrust Act and sections 1 and 2 of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act and also committed tortious interference; they 
sought treble damages and injunctive relief. 76 Another generic 
manufacturer, Actavis Elizabeth LLC (Actavis), tried to intervene as a 
similarly aggrieved generic manufacturer.77 Actavis’s Proposed 
Counterclaim made similar legal claims, including violations of the 
Sherman Act and the New Jersey Antitrust Act.78 The FTC filed an 
amicus brief in this case arguing that current antitrust law supports 
reaching the merits of the arguments.79  
  
                                                                                                                    
 68. Id. at 9. 
 69. Roxane Counterclaim, supra note 16, at 35. 
 70. Id. at 35–36. 
 71. See id. at 23. 
 72. Id. at 39. 
 73. Id. at 58. 
 74. Stewart Bishop, Actelion Says Antitrust Law Can’t Make It Sell to Rivals, LAW360 
(Jan. 17, 2013, 2:41 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/408041/actelion-says-antitrust-law-
can-t-make-it-sell-to-rivals.  
 75. Karst, Actelion Preemptively Sues, supra note 35. 
 76. See Roxane Counterclaim, supra note 16, at 53.  
 77. Karst, Actelion’s Preemptive Strike, supra note 57. 
 78. Id. 
 79. FTC Actelion Brief, supra note 6, at 17. 
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3.  Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Celgene Corp. 
Most recently, the FTC submitted a second REMS-related amicus 
brief80 to the District Court of New Jersey in Mylan Pharmaceuticals 
Inc. v. Celgene Corp.81 In that case, Mylan Pharmaceuticals (Mylan) 
sued Celgene alleging that Celgene’s conduct relating to REMS-
restricted drugs violated federal and state antitrust laws.82 Specifically, 
Mylan, a generic manufacturer, charged that Celgene, a brand 
manufacturer, was using the REMS restrictions on its drugs—Thalomid 
and Revlimid (lenalidomide)—as a pretext for refusing to provide Mylan 
with samples of these drugs.83 Mylan further alleged that, due to 
distribution restrictions put in place by Celgene, it had also been unable 
to obtain samples of these drugs even from wholesalers.84 Mylan sought 
samples of Thalomid and Revlimid to conduct the bioequivalence 
studies required for an ANDA and stated that the FDA had found 
Mylan’s safety protocols for these studies acceptable.85 
Among other relief, Mylan asked the court for a preliminary and 
mandatory injunctive order compelling Celgene to sell Mylan a 
sufficient number of Thalomid and Revlimid samples at market price.86 
Additionally, Mylan sought compensatory damages for the loss of 
generic drug sales due to the delay of Mylan’s ability to submit its 
ANDA.87 Celgene argued in its motion to dismiss that it had no duty to 
deal with a potential competitor,88 and that Mylan’s claims were barred 
as a matter of law because, among other reasons, they failed to plead 
necessary elements, were outside the applicable statute of limitations, or 
were precluded by presumptively valid patents.89 Oral arguments on 
Celgene’s motion to dismiss took place on December 9, 2014.90 
4.  Claims in the Private Antitrust Cases 
The primary antitrust claim in these three cases was that REMS-
restricted brand-name drug manufacturers violated the antitrust laws 
                                                                                                                    
 80. FTC Mylan Brief, supra note 6. 
 81. No. 2:14-CV-2094 (D.N.J. Apr. 3, 2014). 
 82. Id. at 1. 
 83. Mylan Complaint, supra note 5, at 2, 4. 
 84. Id. at 4, 21–22. 
 85. Id. at 3, 4, 21. 
 86. Id. at 81. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Brief in Support of Defendant Celgene Corp.’s Motion to Dismiss at 14, Mylan Pharm. 
Inc. v. Celgene Corp., No. 2:14-CV-2094 (D.N.J. May 25, 2014). 
 89. Id. at 25, 28–29, 36. 
 90. Oral Opinion at 2, Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Celgene Corp., No. 2:14-CV-2094 (D.N.J. 
Dec. 22, 2014). 
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when they refused to provide samples to generic manufacturers who 
sought to reverse engineer the bioequivalence of the patented brand-
name drug.91 The REMS-restricted brand-name drug manufacturers 
claimed that they had a right to refuse to deal with their rivals and that 
there was no antitrust or other legal duty to provide drug samples to a 
rival.92 Although exceptions to the refusal-to-deal doctrine exist, the 
brand manufacturers asserted that these cases were not applicable.93 
The generic manufacturers responded that brand manufacturers have 
used the REMS program as a pretext to restrict access to brand-name 
drugs rather than as an actual effort to benefit consumers.94 As evidence, 
they pointed to a letter from the FDA stating that the agency did not 
intend “to permit the restrictions of the [REMS] program to prevent 
manufacturers of generic drugs from obtaining [samples] for use in 
bioequivalence testing necessary to obtain [ANDA] approval.”95 
Generic manufacturers further argued that refusal to provide drug 
samples is merely an effort by brand manufacturers to maintain 
monopoly power and prevent otherwise lawful generic competition that 
would inevitably bring down prices and benefit consumers.96 This 
argument alleged predatory intent and exclusionary conduct while 
denying any purported procompetitive justifications.97 
Generic manufacturers have also framed brand-name drugs as 
“essential facilities” necessary to enter into competitive antitrust 
markets.98 Brand manufacturers responded that the essential-facilities 
doctrine is a dead letter that would not apply in a heavily regulated 
                                                                                                                    
 91. See Lannett Co. v. Celgene Corp., No. 08-3920, 2011 WL 1193912, at *1 (E.D. Pa. 
Mar. 29, 2011); Actelion Complaint, supra note 5, at 2; Mylan Complaint, supra note 5, at 2–4. 
 92. See, e.g., Actelion Complaint, supra note 5, at 9–10; Mylan Complaint, supra note 5, 
at 35. 
 93. See, e.g., Actelion Complaint, supra note 5, at 11–13. 
 94. See, e.g., Roxane Counterclaim, supra note 16, at 28; Mylan Complaint, supra note 5, 
at 2–4, 21. 
 95. Roxane Counterclaim, supra note 16, at 29. This statement did little to settle the 
ongoing litigation over the issue and fell substantially short of imposing a requirement on the 
brand manufacturer to give samples to generic manufacturers. See Karst, Decision in Lannett, 
supra note 12; Rodi & Hughes, supra note 3. The FDA has also given some assurances that 
bioequivalence studies are conducted with safe procedures, which should fulfill any concerns 
about the REMS requirements. See, e.g., DRAFT GUIDANCE ON THALIDOMIDE, U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN. (Dec. 2012), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceCompliance
RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM320038.pdf; How to Obtain a Letter from FDA Stating 
that Bioequivalence Study Protocols Contain Safety Protection Comparable to Applicable REMS 
for RLD, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Dec. 2014), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/
GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM425662.pdf. 
 96. See, e.g., Roxane Counterclaim, supra note 16, at 20–21. 
 97. Id. at 30, 41–42. 
 98. Id. at 45–46. 
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industry where the supposed monopolist is fully complying with its 
regulatory requirements.99 
5.  The FTC’s Analysis of the REMS Cases 
The FTC and Connecticut’s attorney general’s office have both 
launched an investigation in the aftermath of Lannett.100 Markus Meier, 
assistant director of the FTC’s Healthcare Division, stated that the FTC 
“definitely see[s REMS abuse] as a significant threat to competition.”101 
Then-FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz echoed these sentiments at the 2012 
ABA Spring Antitrust Meeting.102 Connecticut’s Attorney General, 
George Jepsen, has expressed his concern that these refusals are part of 
“a disturbing, broader trend by certain branded drug manufacturers” to 
use the REMS program “as a weapon to blunt the development of generic 
drugs.”103  
The FTC has publicly contributed to the debate on REMS-restricted 
drugs by filing amicus briefs in the Actelion and Mylan cases in support 
of the generics’ viewpoint that restricting access to brand-name drugs 
may restrict competition and raise a triable antitrust issue.104 In general, 
the FTC stated that “[u]nder certain circumstances, . . . a monopolist’s 
refusal to sell to its rivals may violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act, and 
vertical agreements may violate Section 1.”105 The FTC, thus, believes 
that the generic manufacturers pled a plausible case for exclusionary 
conduct under section 2 by restricting access to a necessary product.106 
The FTC expressed concerns that this strategy by brand 
manufacturers could pose a serious impediment to competition in the 
                                                                                                                    
 99. Actelion Complaint, supra note 5, at 13. 
 100. Dina ElBoghdady, Generic-Drug Makers’ Complaints over Brand-Name Access 
Prompt Investigations, WASH. POST (May 22, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
business/economy/generic-drug-makers-complaints-over-distribution-law-provoke-investiga 
tions/2012/0522/gIQAhExKiU_story.html.  
 101. Thomas, Drug Makers Use Safety, supra note 45. 
 102. Jonathan M. Ritch, R. Brendan Fee & Sarah Sandok Rabinovici, Healthcare Tops the 
Agenda of U.S. Antitrust Enforcers, MORGAN LEWIS (Apr. 4, 2012), 
www.morganlewis.com/index.cfm/fuseaction/publication.detail/publicationID/decf0a6b-c206-
4055-a3e0-d57f2976654d. 
 103. ElBoghdady, supra note 100 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 104. Note that the FTC’s filings do not go so far as to say that it believes there is a violation 
but merely state that it thinks there are cognizable antitrust claims. See, e.g., Press Release, FTC 
Amicus Brief: Improper Use of Restricted Drug Distribution Programs May Impede Generic 
Competition, FED. TRADE COMM’N (June 19, 2014), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2014/06/ftc-amicus-brief-improper-use-restricted-drug-distribution; FTC Amicus Brief: 
Improper Use of Restricted Drug Distribution Programs May Impede Generic Competition, FED. 
TRADE COMM’N (Mar. 12, 2013), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2013/03/actelion.shtm. 
 105. FTC Mylan Brief, supra note 6, at 8. 
 106. Id. at 8–9. 
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pharmaceutical industry,107 and might “prove costly for consumers of 
prescription drugs [because competition] from lower priced generic 
drugs saves American consumers billions of dollars a year.”108 The 
FTC’s filings emphasized that the accelerated approval of generic drugs 
under the Hatch–Waxman Act was very important in facilitating 
competition and bringing down the cost of drugs for consumers.109  
The FTC claimed that refusing to provide drug samples subverted the 
goals of the Hatch–Waxman Act and possibly constituted violations of 
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.110 The agency noted that 
bioequivalence testing requires a limited amount of the brand-name drug 
in order for testing to proceed, and that allowing brand manufacturers to 
restrict access throws a wrench into the entire generic drug development 
process.111 The FDA has clarified, and also noted in its briefs, that a 
brand manufacturer “may” sell samples of REMS-restricted drugs to a 
generic manufacturer for bioequivalence testing without violating the 
REMS.112 The FTC believes that neither the REMS restrictions nor the 
drug’s patent protection is sufficient to justify restrictions on distribution 
to generic manufacturers.113 The FTC focuses on the need for generic 
substitution laws and the development of these generics under the 
Hatch–Waxman Act as essential elements of reducing healthcare costs 
by encouraging rapid development of lower priced drug options.114  
II.  REMS-RESTRICTED DRUGS AND THE BRAND MANUFACTURER’S 
RIGHT TO REFUSE TO DEAL WITH GENERIC COMPETITORS 
The FTC, without expressing an opinion on the ultimate merits of the 
antitrust claims, provided an analysis of the Supreme Court’s section 2 
jurisprudence in both of its amicus briefs and concluded in its Actelion 
brief that “[t]he allegations in this case therefore fall within the 
established contours of the Supreme Court’s refusal to deal 
precedent.”115 Although notably quiet as to the ultimate conclusions of 
                                                                                                                    
 107. Id. at 7. 
 108. Id. at 1. 
 109. Id. at 3–4; FTC Actelion Brief, supra note 6, at 4. The FTC voted 4–0 to file an amicus 
brief in the Actelion case and voted 4–1 to file an amicus brief in the Mylan case, with only 
Commissioner Joshua Wright voting against the filing. See Press Release, supra note 104. 
 110. FTC Mylan Brief, supra note 6, at 7–8, 15–17. 
 111. FTC Actelion Brief, supra note 6, at 4.  
 112. See FTC Mylan Brief, supra note 6, at 19; FTC Actelion Brief, supra note 6, at 7. 
 113. See David Leichtman, Inside the FTC’s Take on Generic Access to Branded Drugs, 
LAW 360 (Apr. 5, 2013, 11:39 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/429209/inside-the-ftc-s-
take-on-generic-access-to-branded-drugs.  
 114. See, e.g., FTC Actelion Brief, supra note 6, at 17. 
 115. Id. at 15. One practitioner has argued that the FTC’s distinction on section 2 cases in 
this area ignores “the public nature of the infrastructure” as the cause of monopoly power in the 
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these cases, the FTC has stated that “the evidence may not ultimately 
support any of the Sherman Act claims in this case, [but] the FTC 
respectfully submits that they are not barred as a matter of law.”116  
This Part summarizes the antitrust refusal-to-deal doctrine under 
section 2 of the Sherman Act by analyzing prior Supreme Court 
precedent cited in the FTC’s amicus briefs. It then discusses the various 
tests in refusal-to-deal cases, such as the “no economic sense” or profit-
sacrifice test, and determines how prior course of dealings factor into the 
tests. This Part then argues that refusal-to-deal claims in the REMS 
context should be evaluated under the profit-sacrifice test.  
A.  Leading Refusal-to-Deal Cases 
In its amicus briefs, the FTC offered a tortured analysis of section 2 
jurisprudence in an ill-fated attempt to ramrod the facts of Actelion into 
decades-old exceptions to the well-settled refusal-to-deal doctrine. 
Looking to Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States,117 Aspen Skiing Co. v. 
Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.,118 and Verizon Communications Inc. v. 
Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP,119 the FTC sought to distinguish 
these cases from the general rule that companies do not have a duty to 
assist their rivals.120 Any comprehensive discussion of section 2 liability 
requires an examination of these cases to sufficiently consider the 
existing Supreme Court precedent. This Section analyzes the cases that 
the FTC relied on to support its refusal-to-deal antitrust claims as well 
as additional cases. This Section also distinguishes the present dispute 
from the leading refusal-to-deal cases. 
1.  Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States 
In Otter Tail, the defendant, Otter Tail Power Co., was a power 
company that used its monopoly in the retail distribution of electric 
power to inhibit local towns from shifting their services to municipal 
power providers.121 Otter Tail used franchise agreements with local 
towns, but after the agreements expired, a number of the localities voted 
                                                                                                                    
case. See Leichtman, supra note 113. Thereby, the FTC’s argument—Actelion’s actions might 
foreclose competition—does not sufficiently consider that in Otter Tail Power Co. v. United 
States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) and Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 
585 (1985), the essential facilities were naturally limited resources or public goods, a limitation 
not present in the current controversy. Id. 
 116. FTC Mylan Brief, supra note 6, at 8; FTC Actelion Brief, supra note 6, at 8–9. 
 117. 410 U.S. 366 (1973). 
 118. 472 U.S. 585 (1985). 
 119. 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
 120. FTC Actelion Brief, supra note 6, at 9. 
 121. 410 U.S. at 368. 
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to establish their own municipal electric systems.122 The new systems 
required Otter Tail’s cooperation and transmission infrastructure to 
operate.123 Otter Tail refused to cooperate and prevented development of 
the new systems, thereby maintaining Otter Tail’s monopoly in retail 
distribution of electric power.124 The Supreme Court affirmed a district 
court opinion finding that Otter Tail had “used its monopoly power in 
the towns in its service area to foreclose competition or gain a 
competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor, all in violation of the 
antitrust laws.”125  
Otter Tail is a case where the Court found section 2 antitrust liability 
despite a lack of a prior course of dealings between the parties and where 
the actions of a monopolist foreclosed competition with a mere 
“potential entrant[].”126 This characterization of the case is correct, and 
other commentators have reached the same conclusion.127 Nevertheless, 
Otter Tail stands for a very limited proposition and rule. Rather than 
representing a strong duty to deal, the Otter Tail decision is restricted to 
its fairly limited facts. Otter Tail represented a natural monopoly where 
the high start-up costs and the low marginal costs of doing business only 
allowed a single operator in any one limited area.128 The power industry 
is heavily regulated and controlled by outside regulatory agencies, 
making the Court’s antitrust decision easier to implement because there 
was little need for the Court to oversee the resulting duty to deal.129 
Moreover, Otter Tail had already incurred the cost of the required 
infrastructure and, other than the ability to limit the development of 
future rivals, would have nothing to lose from complying with its 
regulatory obligation to “wheel” the power of municipal power 
providers.130 Accordingly, Otter Tail’s refusal made no economic sense 
                                                                                                                    
 122. Id. at 371. 
 123. Id. at 370. 
 124. Id. at 371–73. 
 125. Id. at 377. 
 126. FTC Actelion Brief, supra note 6, at 9–10 (quoting Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 377) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 127. See, e.g., Susan A. Creighton & Jonathan M. Jacobson, Twenty-Five Years of Access 
Denials, 27 ANTITRUST 50, 53 (2012) (“Fairly read, then, neither Aspen [Skiing] nor Kodak 
compels a prior course of dealing screen. And, importantly, Otter Tail—a decision that the 
Supreme Court has never questioned and often cites—is inconsistent with any such rule.”). 
 128. See Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 369. 
 129. See Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 
ANTITRUST L.J. 841, 848 (1990) (“[T]here was already in place a regulatory agency that 
supervised prices and terms of dealings with local distributors. Thus, the Court could airily 
require Otter Tail to deal but never burden itself with the administrative details, because the 
Federal Power Commission had the statutory authority and presumed expertness to regulate the 
prices and terms of dealing. Otter Tail is thus quite narrow.”). 
 130. See id. at 847–48. 
18
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 3 [2016], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss3/3
2015] REMS-RESTRICTED DRUG DISTRIBUTION PROGRAMS 995 
 
other than as an anticompetitive scheme.131  
Refusing to provide brand-name drug samples is distinguishable from 
Otter Tail because the brand manufacturers are not under a clear 
regulatory obligation to provide samples and, as discussed below, these 
actions were taken with legitimate business justifications.132 The 
regulatory goals of Congress and federal agencies need to be held 
distinct from the broader and more generalized goals of antitrust, a 
position the Supreme Court eventually took in Trinko.133  
2.  Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. 
In Aspen Skiing, the plaintiff (Aspen) owned three of four major ski 
resorts in Aspen, Colorado, while Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. 
(Highlands) owned the fourth resort.134 Aspen and Highlands provided a 
single pass that allowed entry into all four resorts.135 But then Aspen 
terminated the pass, which severely limited Highlands’ patronage.136 
Aspen refused to offer the four-resort pass despite Highlands’ offer to 
accept a fairly low fixed percentage of the joint revenues.137 Aspen also 
refused to sell tickets to Highlands’ resort and refused to honor vouchers 
that Highlands issued as part of its competing pass.138 Highlands sued, 
alleging that Aspen’s refusal to deal constituted a violation of section 2 
of the Sherman Act because Aspen had used its monopoly power to 
foreclose competition and act predatorily.139 The Supreme Court 
affirmed the finding of the district court that Aspen did have a duty to 
deal because its conduct was not supported by any valid business or 
efficiency justifications.140 The Court declared that a firm’s refusal to 
deal is not unqualified and that the prior course of dealings between the 
two companies and Highlands’ offer to essentially insure Aspen at full 
retail price amounted to a duty to offer the four-mountain pass.141 
Moreover, the Court found that Aspen’s behavior was exclusionary and 
was tantamount to predatory action that justified liability under section 
2.142  
                                                                                                                    
 131. See Creighton & Jacobson, supra note 127, at 54.  
 132. See infra Section II.C. 
 133. See infra text accompanying note 157. 
 134. 472 U.S. 585, 587–88 & nn. 2–5 (1985). 
 135. Id. at 591. 
 136. Id. at 594. 
 137. Id. at 591–93. 
 138. Id. at 593–94. 
 139. Id. at 595. 
 140. Id. at 608–09, 611. 
 141. Id. at 601, 603. 
 142. Id. at 610. 
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In its Actelion brief, the FTC turned to Aspen Skiing for the 
proposition that exclusionary conduct is more suspect when it is 
undertaken for reasons other than efficiency.143 The FTC noted that the 
Supreme Court in Aspen Skiing characterized the conduct as being taken 
for predatory reasons when it “does not further competition on the 
merits” and “impair[s] the opportunities of rivals.”144 Nevertheless, the 
FTC provided no analogy or factual discussion that compared Actelion 
to the Aspen Skiing exception, and it merely presumed predatory 
intent.145 As explained below, the rule from Aspen Skiing is notably 
limited by the Court’s subsequent decision in Trinko, which makes clear 
that Aspen Skiing is a rare exception that “is at or near the outer boundary 
of § 2 liability.”146  
The Actelion, Lannett, and Mylan cases are more distinguishable 
from Aspen Skiing than they are similar. First, as noted by the FTC, there 
is no prior course of dealing from which to infer that the refusal to deal 
would be profitable.147 Second, as is true of all generic market entry, 
there are obvious reasons to believe that such generic entry would harm 
a brand manufacturer’s profits and reduce its incentive to invest in new 
drugs in the future.148 Third, as discussed below, there are valid business 
reasons that justify the brand manufacturers’ refusals to deal.149 Taken 
together, the FTC draws a shallow comparison to the exception in Aspen 
Skiing and assumes away all evidence to the contrary without a 
substantive discussion of the competitive merits of the alleged business 
conduct.  
3.  Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of 
Curtis V. Trinko, LLP 
In Trinko, the Court found that Verizon, the incumbent local 
exchange carrier, “enjoyed an exclusive franchise within its local service 
area.”150 Verizon competed with local exchange carriers but had a 
regulatory obligation to complete “orders for service through an 
                                                                                                                    
 143. FTC Actelion Brief, supra note 6, at 10. 
 144. Id. (quoting Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 605, n.32 (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 145. See id. 
 146. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 409 
(2004); see also United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919) (holding that the 
antitrust laws do “not restrict the long recognized right of [a] trader or manufacturer engaged in 
an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with 
whom he will deal”).  
 147. FTC Actelion Brief, supra note 6, at 12. 
 148. See infra Section III.A. 
 149. See infra Section II.C. 
 150. 540 U.S. at 402. 
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electronic interface with Verizon’s ordering system.”151 Complaints 
emerged that Verizon was discriminatorily fulfilling these orders and 
creating a substantial barrier to entry for potential rivals.152 Verizon was 
concurrently under investigation by the FCC and ultimately entered into 
a consent decree to ensure compliance with its regulatory obligations.153 
The Court concluded that Verizon did not have a duty to deal with its 
rivals and rejected the notion that separate congressional or regulatory 
obligations altered Verizon’s antitrust obligations.154 The Court 
reasoned that monopolists might legally charge monopoly prices and do 
not have expanded obligations to deal with rivals.155 The Court also 
warned about error costs in complicated and heavily regulated 
industries.156 It indicated that the general competition goals of the 
antitrust laws are often inconsistent with the more specific goals of 
congressional regulation: “Mistaken inferences and the resulting false 
condemnations ‘are especially costly, because they chill the very conduct 
the antitrust laws are designed to protect.’”157 
In its Actelion brief, the FTC looked to Trinko for three exceptions to 
the general principle that there is no obligation to aid your rivals. First, 
the FTC did not believe that a prior course of dealing was a prerequisite 
to finding antitrust liability.158 Instead, the FTC argued that the Court 
should look to the effects on competition and a company’s decision to 
sacrifice short-term profits absent a procompetitive business 
justification.159 This approach is correct and, regardless of the existence 
of a valid business reason, indicates that refusals to provide drug samples 
for generic development may warrant a searching inquiry into the details 
of the relevant market. As discussed above, the FTC does not delve into 
efficiency justifications and does not provide a closer comparison of the 
cases.160  
Second, the FTC looked to language in Trinko stating that the 
company was refusing to sell something it “was already in the business 
of providing.”161 In other words, by the FTC’s logic, providing these 
samples to generic manufacturers would not impose any increased 
                                                                                                                    
 151. Id. at 403. 
 152. Id. at 404. 
 153. Id. at 403–04. 
 154. Id. at 409–11. 
 155. Id. at 407–08. 
 156. Id. at 414–15. 
 157. Id. at 414 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 
594 (1986)). 
 158. FTC Actelion Brief, supra note 6, at 11–12. 
 159. Id. at 12–13. 
 160. See supra text accompanying notes 143–49. 
 161. FTC Actelion Brief, supra note 6, at 14 (quoting Trinko, 540 U.S. at 410). 
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burden or harm on brand manufacturers because the companies were 
already supplying the drugs to someone other than the generic.162 This 
argument ignores the basic presumption that these companies have a 
right to choose with whom they do business. Brand manufacturers sell 
drugs to consumers, hospitals, and wholesalers, but none of these sales 
create a duty to sell to a competing generic manufacturer.163 Again, it is 
true that the sales would have no immediate adverse effect,164 but that 
fact is generally irrelevant to the overarching antitrust obligations. The 
FTC seemingly argued that brand manufacturers have an obligation to 
deal with their rivals merely because it is possible.165 That argument is 
insufficient to clear the high hurdle imposed in Trinko and provides no 
illumination as to why such an obligation should exist.  
Third, the FTC stated that many of the anticompetitive concerns 
expressed in Trinko, including (1) “undermin[ing] the incentive to 
invest” in the joint product, (2) “setting the terms and conditions on 
which the monopolist must deal,” and (3) “encouraging collusion 
between the monopolist and its would-be rivals,” are not present in these 
pharmaceutical cases.166 
Although the second and third points are likely true, the first is much 
less clear.167 A substantial amount of research suggests that earlier 
generic entry and the uncertainty of patent terms created by the Hatch–
Waxman Act may have significant effects on the incentive to invest in 
new drugs.168 Patent length is less certain, and the return on investment 
is lower when there is the uncertainty of infringement lawsuits and 
                                                                                                                    
 162. Id. at 15. 
 163. See Actelion Complaint, supra note 5, at 10. 
 164. FTC Actelion Brief, supra note 6, at 15. 
 165. See id. at 14–15. 
 166. Id. at 14–15 (citing Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407–08). 
 167. It is possible that the second point might also be a concern in the REMS context. It is 
unlikely that the FTC or federal courts will be effective central planners for terms and conditions 
or supply contracts between brand and generic firms for REMS-restricted drugs. It is equally 
unlikely that the FTC or courts will be the best day-to-day enforcer of any established supply 
contract provisions. See Jan M. Rybnicek, When Does Sharing Make Sense?: Antitrust & Risk 
Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Apr. 2014, at 7, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2429330 (proposing that the FDA, not the 
FTC, should use its “existing tools” to regulate REMs-restricted drugs). 
 168. See Panattoni, supra note 8, at 144 (“Paragraph IV decisions, largely starting in the 
late 1990s, may have strong implications for R&D incentives and . . . brand firms may have a 
considerable incentive to avoid the uncertainty and large potential profitability [losses] 
associated with these decisions. . . . [A] practical reality for the pharmaceutical industry was that 
patent length was more certain before 1998 than it was in the period afterward. An uncertain 
patent length has the benefits of possible early generic entry but brand and generic reactions raise 
the potential for negative welfare consequences.”).  
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earlier generic entry.169 Accordingly, a longer guaranteed period of 
brand exclusivity ensures a strong incentive for manufacturing 
companies to invest in new and innovative drugs.  
Also, as one response has noted, Trinko departed from previous 
refusal-to-deal cases specifically because it emphasized that monopoly 
power is lawful, and often desirable, in markets, and that a strong right 
to refuse to deal has many economic justifications, such as increasing the 
“incentive to invest in markets characterized by scale economies” and 
avoiding the necessity for “courts to act as central planners.”170 Both 
benefits would be realized in the REMS-restriction cases and weigh 
against antitrust intervention.  
4.  The Profit-Sacrifice Test, No-Economic-Sense Test, and 
Prior Course of Dealing 
The starting point for any refusal-to-deal analysis is that there is no 
duty to deal and that only exceptional and exceedingly rare 
circumstances allow for such a finding under the antitrust laws. The 
Court has previously found antitrust liability for refusal to deal in cases 
where a firm refused to sell a product or service to some competitors but 
not others, or where a firm was engaged in a prior course of dealing with 
a competitor and then changed course by refusing to continue to deal.171 
Literature identifies two main tests for a refusal-to-deal analysis: the 
profit-sacrifice test and the no-economic-sense test.172  
A prior course of dealing can serve as a proxy for evaluating the 
potential economic harms or benefits resulting from the conduct.173 For 
example, a prior course of dealing suggests that the refusal results in the 
sacrifice of profits and likely indicates that there is no valid business 
justification for the change in course.174 One commentator has explained 
the profit-sacrifice test as follows: “[T]he decision maker weighs the 
costs and benefits of the conduct to the defendant. In particular, under 
                                                                                                                    
 169. See id. 
 170. Creighton & Jacobson, supra note 127, at 50–51. 
 171. Guide to Antitrust Laws: Refusal to Deal, FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
http://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/single-firm-conduct/ 
refusal-deal (last visited May 1, 2015); see also, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands 
Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605, 608–11 (1985); Areeda, supra note 129, at 852. 
 172. See A. Douglas Melamed, Exclusive Dealing Agreements and Other Exclusionary 
Conduct—Are There Unifying Principles?, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 375, 389 (2006) (describing the 
profit-sacrifice test); Gregory J. Werden, Identifying Exclusionary Conduct Under Section 2: The 
“No Economic Sense” Test, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 413, 422 (2006) (describing the no-economic-
sense test). 
 173. See Creighton & Jacobson, supra note 127, at 52. 
 174. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 
409 (2004). 
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this test, conduct is anticompetitive if, but only if, it makes no business 
sense or is unprofitable for the defendant but for the exclusion of rivals 
and resulting supra-competitive recoupment.”175 Note that the test sets a 
fairly high bar for finding antitrust liability.176  
This test is conceptually identical to the no-economic-sense test, 
which is named merely to avoid confusion with obviously 
procompetitive conduct that sacrifices short-run profits, such as research 
and development or the costs of training employees.177 One reading of 
the relationship between the tests, rooted in Aspen Skiing and Otter Tail, 
is that a prior course of dealing can be evidence that the no economic 
sense test is satisfied.178 To determine the justifiability of a firm’s 
behavior, Professor Douglas Melamed believes that “[f]irms will have to 
ask only whether their conduct makes good business sense regardless of 
increases in their market power.”179 This is because a legitimate business 
purpose will generally succeed in defending even a suspicious refusal to 
deal against an alleged antitrust violation.180  
B.  Regulation and Antitrust in Credit Suisse 
There is ample literature on the relationship between regulation and 
antitrust, establishing that at times antitrust liability is not the most 
appropriate remedy, especially when other regulatory frameworks are 
already in place.181 If Trinko makes clear that refusal-to-deal cases are 
                                                                                                                    
 175. Melamed, supra note 172, at 389. Professor Douglas Melamed argues that the two 
relevant inquiries for this test are whether the defendant has given up profitable sales in a cost-
benefit analysis and whether the conduct allowed the defendant to increase or maintain its market 
power by forgoing otherwise unprofitable sales. Id. at 389–90; see also Werden, supra note 172, 
at 414 (“[T]hat test asks whether challenged conduct would have been expected to be profitable 
apart from any gains that conduct may produce through eliminating competition.”). 
 176. See Melamed, supra note 172, at 390 & n.42. 
 177. For an explanation of the no-economic-sense test, see Werden, supra note 172, at 422–
25. For a discussion of the no-economic-sense test in the REMS context, see Rybnicek, supra 
note 167, at 6–7. 
 178. See generally Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); Aspen 
Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 597 (1985). 
 179. Melamed, supra note 172, at 393. 
 180. Areeda, supra note 129, at 852. 
 181. See, e.g., Bruce H. Kobayashi & Joshua D. Wright, Federalism, Substantive 
Preemption, and Limits on Antitrust: An Application to Patent Holdup, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & 
ECON. 469, 475 (2009) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s antitrust jurisprudence is consistent with the 
proposition that the extension of antitrust liability to conduct that is adequately regulated by 
alternative legal rules and institutions is appropriately limited when the marginal benefit of 
antitrust enforcement is low or negative.”); Howard A. Shelanski, The Case for Rebalancing 
Antitrust and Regulation, 109 MICH. L. REV. 683, 684–85 (2011) (discussing the changing role 
of and limitations on antitrust in regulated markets). 
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on the outer boundary of section 2 antitrust liability,182 Credit Suisse 
Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing 183 may put similar cases completely out 
of reach.184 In Credit Suisse, a class of buyers of securities alleged that 
underwriting firms engaged in behavior that violated antitrust laws.185 
The buyers alleged that in order to purchase a popular new security, the 
underwriters set up an agreement that forced buyers to purchase 
additional shares of that security at increasingly higher prices (called 
“laddering”), pay the underwriters unusually high commissions on future 
purchases, or purchase less desirable securities (called “tying”).186 The 
Court agreed with the underwriters that federal securities law and the 
active supervision of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
impliedly exempted this behavior from antitrust scrutiny.187  
The Court believed that this case fell within their existing preemption 
test from Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc.,188 where the Court 
would not apply antitrust law when: (1) the conduct fell “squarely within 
the heartland of securities regulations;” (2) the SEC had “clear and 
adequate” authority to regulate; (3) there was “active and ongoing 
agency regulation;” and (4) there was “a serious conflict between the 
antitrust and regulatory regimes.”189 The fourth consideration was the 
most hotly contested, but the Court found that the complexities of 
securities law were best left to the SEC to regulate, and that a conflicting 
antitrust regime would “threaten[] serious securities-related harm.”190 
Moreover, the SEC already takes competition concerns into account in 
applying securities law, thereby making a separate cause of action in 
federal court unnecessary.191  
Some commentators suggest that Credit Suisse takes a step beyond 
Trinko by disapproving antitrust scrutiny of behavior governed by 
regulatory bodies with active and ongoing supervision.192 The FTC’s 
                                                                                                                    
 182. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 
408–09 (2004). 
 183. 551 U.S. 264 (2007). 
 184. See Kobayashi & Wright, supra note 181, at 474 (“Specifically, Credit Suisse 
recognizes the value of limiting antitrust enforcement under circumstances where an alternative 
and competent regulatory apparatus is available and antitrust enforcement is likely to result in 
little additional social value because of the potential for welfare-reducing errors.”).  
 185. 551 U.S. at 267. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 267–68. 
 188. 422 U.S. 659 (1975). 
 189. Credit Suisse, 551 U.S. at 285. 
 190. Id. at 279. 
 191. See, e.g., id. at 283. 
 192. See Kobayashi & Wright, supra note 181, at 477 (“The message from the Court in 
Credit Suisse is that caution and modesty are warranted in considering an expansion of antitrust 
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briefs in Actelion and Mylan notably omit Credit Suisse,193 even though 
a colorable argument can be made that Actelion’s or Celgene’s actions 
should qualify for implied immunity from antitrust law under the Credit 
Suisse standard. Applying the Gordon test to these refusal-to-deal cases 
shows the first two prongs easily satisfied. That is, the FDA’s authority 
in this case (1) likely fits squarely within the heartland of pharmaceutical 
regulation because (2) the FDA has authority to enforce its own rules.194  
Generic manufacturers will certainly argue that the FDA’s failure to 
clarify the regulatory obligation in these cases means they have not met 
the third prong of the test involving active and ongoing regulation,195 but 
a court would likely disagree with this characterization. The FDA is 
aware of and actively involved in these cases. The agency has responded 
to some of the citizen petitions and, as recently as July 2013, held a 
public meeting to receive outside comment for reform.196 The generic 
manufacturers’ dissatisfaction with the pace and level of FDA action is 
not an argument that the agency is failing to actively regulate. It should 
be noted, however, that the FDA has acknowledged that it is not best 
positioned to address the competition-related issues raised by REMSs.197 
In fact, the FDA stated in a recent citizen petition response that “issues 
related to ensuring that marketplace actions are fair and do not block 
competition would be best addressed by the FTC, which is the Federal 
entity most expert in investigating and addressing anticompetitive 
business practices.”198 Of course, the agencies do not decide their 
jurisdiction over REMS-related competition concerns; rather, Congress 
determines this issue.199 This is why we should be careful not to construe 
the FDA’s request for help as grounds for FTC intervention in this area. 
The applicability of the fourth prong of the Gordon test to REMS 
restriction refusal-to-deal cases is unclear and likely a closer call than in 
Credit Suisse.200 It is difficult to determine if there is a conflict between 
                                                                                                                    
liability when there is a competent alternative regulatory structure in place and the risks of false 
positives is significant.”). 
 193. See generally FTC Mylan Brief, supra note 6; FTC Actelion Brief, supra note 6. 
 194. See Credit Suisse, 551 U.S. at 285. 
 195. Id. at 285. 
 196. See Public Meeting: Standardizing and Evaluating Risk Evaluation and Mitigation 
Strategies, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/forindustry/userfees/
prescriptiondruguserfee/ucm351029.htm (last updated Sept. 17, 2013). 
 197. Letter from Janet Woodcock, supra note 40, at 7. 
 198. Id. 
 199. See id. at 7–8 (recognizing the limits of the FDA’s existing authority to collaborate 
with the FTC over REMS-related issues); Independent Agencies and Government Corporations, 
USA.GOV, http://www.usa.gov/Agencies/Federal/Independent.shtml (last updated Feb. 2, 2015) 
(noting that Congress creates independent agencies and thus the extent of their jurisdictions). 
 200. See Credit Suisse, 551 U.S. at 285. 
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the goals of pharmaceutical regulation and antitrust law because 
resolution of this question requires the application of both claims prior 
to deciding whether the antitrust claims are even relevant. The antitrust 
laws focus on promoting competition, consumer welfare, and price-
effects, while relevant pharmaceutical regulations, including the 
FDAAA, are more concerned with patient health and safety.201 There is 
not an obvious conflict, but even critics of Credit Suisse have admitted 
that the result is broad and creates a wide area of antitrust immunity in 
regulated industries. Howard Shelanski, former-Deputy Director for 
Antitrust in the Bureau of Economics at the FTC, submitted a written 
statement to Congress that included the following:  
Credit Suisse goes beyond prior implied immunity cases by 
blocking some antitrust claims that are based on legitimate 
antitrust principles, are consistent with securities laws, and 
are not potentially repugnant to the regulatory scheme, but 
where the underlying conduct is similar enough to regulated 
conduct that a judge might confuse the two and create a 
conflict with regulatory authority.202  
The Court in Credit Suisse does not articulate a cogent statement of 
what it means for the statutes to conflict. The Court does, however, 
provide some factors to consider, including: (1) the regulatory agency’s 
concern with antitrust policy; (2) the possibility of error costs in general 
district courts and private suits; (3) the likelihood of conflicting guidance 
or requirements; and (4) the likelihood that antitrust juries would make 
serious mistakes.203  
Applied to REMS restriction refusal-to-deal cases, the first factor 
sways against the application of antitrust immunity because the FDA is 
not concerned with competition policy.204 But the remaining factors are 
certainly debatable. This Article argues that these REMS restriction-
                                                                                                                    
 201. Compare ANTITRUSTLAWS.ORG, http://www.antitrustlaws.org/ (last visited May 1, 
2015) (noting the goals of antitrust laws), with Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act 
(FDAAA) of 2007, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/regulatoryinformation/legislation/federalfooddrug
andcosmeticactfdcact/significantamendmentstothefdcact/foodanddrugadministrationamendmen
tsactof2007/default.htm (last updated Dec. 2, 2011) (explaining the benefits of the FDAAA). 
 202. Is There Life After Trinko and Credit Suisse? The Role of Antitrust in Regulated 
Industries: Hearing Before the H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Courts and 
Competition Policy, 111th Cong. 6 (2010) (statement of the Federal Trade Commission), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2010/06/prepared-statement-federal-trade-
commission-courts-and-competition-policy. 
 203. See Credit Suisse, 551 U.S. at 275–76, 281–82. It can be inferred from this guidance 
that the analysis is more detailed than merely asking what the generalized goals of the two 
statutes at issue seek to promote. Accordingly, courts may need to evaluate the specific claims 
in a case—in a broader regulatory context—to reach a sensible conclusion.  
 204. See Letter from Janet Woodcock, supra note 40, at 7. 
27
Butler: REMS-Restricted Drug Distribution Programs and the Antitrust Econ
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
1004 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67 
 
related cases raise a high likelihood of significant error costs205 and 
promote harmful market uncertainty.206 This Article also argues that if 
brand manufacturers are violating neither the FDAAA nor the antitrust 
laws, then Credit Suisse is inapplicable, meaning that antitrust law 
should be applied but it was not violated. Alternatively, if a brand 
manufacturer has violated antitrust law, then Credit Suisse might still 
provide a safe harbor from liability if a court determines that there is a 
conflict after comparing the complex goals of the two regimes.207 
Another possibility is that the conduct violates antitrust law that is 
inconsistent with pharmaceutical regulations, meaning that there is a 
conflict and thus rendering the action immune from antitrust law.  
Most likely, Credit Suisse will not apply because there is not an 
intuitive or obvious conflict between the relevant statutes, and there may 
not be a conflict in the interpretation of the specific actions and claims 
of the case; that is, a court may determine that the failure to give drug 
samples to generic drug manufacturers is not an antitrust violation and is 
not a regulatory violation. These two consistent findings mean that a 
court will not apply antitrust immunity under Credit Suisse, but—having 
already found no antitrust violation—a court would then dismiss the 
case.  
C.  Legitimate Business Justifications for a Refusal to Provide 
REMS-Restricted Samples to Generic Competitors 
As stated in Aspen Skiing and reflected in all of the Supreme Court’s 
refusal-to-deal cases, no refusal to deal by a monopolist is deemed 
anticompetitive for purposes of antitrust liability if it is justified by 
“valid business reasons . . . . In other words, if there were legitimate 
business reasons for the refusal, then the defendant, even if he is found 
to possess monopoly power in a relevant market, has not violated the 
                                                                                                                    
 205. See infra Part III.  
 206. See infra Section III.B.  
 207. In one sense this is a chicken-and-the-egg argument because it is possible that a court 
would need to evaluate the merits of the antitrust claim to determine if it should apply antitrust 
law at all. It may be easiest to think about this prong as a matrix with four possibilities: (1) if 
regulatory law is violated and antitrust law is not, then the court could apply antitrust law 
although the outcome is moot; (2) if neither regulatory nor antitrust law were violated, then the 
court will have to consider the goals of both regimes to determine if they are in conflict, but 
again, the outcome is irrelevant; (3) if both regulatory and antitrust law were violated, then there 
is seemingly consistency but a court would still need to determine that those violations did not 
represent conflicting goals; or (4) if regulatory law was not violated but the antitrust laws were, 
then there is a clear conflict and antitrust law should be precluded, likely immunizing the 
behavior from scrutiny.  
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law.”208 Even when the conditions of a refusal to deal are substantially 
or obviously anticompetitive, a “legitimate business purpose always 
saves the defendant.”209 And, in cases with claims more comparable to 
the generic manufacturers than those by Highland in Aspen Skiing, many 
courts have directly recognized, for example, that the desire to exclude 
others from protected intellectual property is itself a presumptively 
lawful valid business justification insulating a refusal to deal from 
antitrust liability.210  
It is notable that the FTC did not take a stance on the issue of valid 
business justifications in the Actelion case. Instead, the FTC stated that 
“Actelion may ultimately demonstrate that its refusal to sell to the 
generic firms is supported by a legitimate business justification. For 
purposes of this motion, however, the generic firms[’] contrary 
allegations are accepted as true.”211 At least three valid business 
justifications, which are addressed in more detail below, support the 
decision to refuse to provide drug samples of REMS- and ETASU-
restricted drugs.  
1.  Regulatory Compliance: Distribution of Drugs Outside of 
the Explicit ETASU Restrictions Could Result in Substantial 
Fines or Penalties 
One example of a REMS-restricted drug that demonstrates some of 
the dangers posed by drugs subject to these restrictions is Thalidomide, 
also marketed under the name Thalomid.212 The drug has a horrific 
history. Prescribed in the 1960s to pregnant women for morning 
sickness, even a single dose of thalidomide could cause severe birth 
defects, or even death, in unborn babies.213 Before the drug was banned 
from pharmacies in 1962, there were an estimated 12,000 “thalidomide 
babies” born with phocomelia—severely deformed arms and legs also 
                                                                                                                    
 208. 472 U.S. 585, 597 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing the case’s jury 
instructions). 
 209. Areeda, supra note 129, at 852. 
 210. See, e.g., Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1218 
(9th Cir. 1997) (“Under the fact-based approaches of Aspen Skiing . . . . a monopolist’s ‘desire 
to exclude others from its [protected] work is a presumptively valid business justification for any 
immediate harm to consumers.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Data Gen. Corp. v. 
Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1187 (1st Cir. 1994))). 
 211. FTC Actelion Brief, supra note 6, at 11 n.32. 
 212. Thalidomide, U.S. NAT’L LIBRARY OF MED., NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, 
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/druginfo/meds/a699032.html (last updated May 19, 2015). 
 213. Id.; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Thalidomide Approved to Treat Leprosy, with Other Uses 
Seen, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/07/17/us/thalidomide-
approved-to-treat-leprosy-with-other-uses-seen.html (reporting on the side effects of 
thalidomide). 
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called “seal-flipper limbs.”214 Only about 5000 “thalidomide babies” 
were still alive in 1998, when the FDA approved the use of thalidomide 
in the United States for the first time after it proved effective at treating 
complications from leprosy.215  
Today, people use the drug to treat not only leprosy but also cancer 
and HIV-related symptoms.216 The side effects, which can occur during 
and after treatment, are severe; aside from causing severe birth defects, 
thalidomide can seriously affect the human nervous system.217 As a 
result, the drug is subject to a REMS program that one observer in 1998 
described as “the most strictly regulated . . . in the nation’s history.”218 
The system includes guidelines that women must at all times use two 
methods of birth control, and must undergo regular pregnancy tests while 
using thalidomide.219 Further, “[a]ll people who are prescribed 
thalidomide . . . must be registered with Thalidomide REMS®, have a 
thalidomide prescription from a doctor who is registered . . . , and have 
the prescription filled at a [registered] pharmacy . . . to receive this 
medication.”220 Additionally, thalidomide patients cannot donate blood 
during and for four weeks after treatment, and doctors may only write “a 
prescription for up to a 28-day supply . . . with no refills,” which the 
patient must fill “within 7 days.”221 
REMS-restricted drugs have greater safety and health risks. The 
thalidomide example illustrates that REMS programs ensure that misuse 
or adverse effects of these drugs can result in the FDA or courts imposing 
substantial fines or regulatory penalties pursuant to federal law. In 
extreme cases, a single REMS violation, when recurring, can warrant up 
to a $10 million fine.222 Due to the significant confusion over the 
                                                                                                                    
 214. Stolberg, supra note 213. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Thalidomide, supra note 212. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Stolberg, supra note 213. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Thalidomide, supra note 212. 
 221. Id. 
 222. The FDA has issued a draft guidance detailing potential fines for violations of the 
requirements. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: 
FORMAT AND CONTENT OF PROPOSED RISK EVALUATION AND MITIGATION STRATEGIES (REMS), 
REMS ASSESSMENTS, AND PROPOSED REMS MODIFICATIONS (Sept. 2009), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/Guidances/UCM184128.pdf. One section states that 
a responsible person who violates a REMS requirement is subject to civil 
monetary penalties of up to $250,000 per violation . . . . These penalties increase 
if the violation continues more than 30 days after FDA notifies the responsible 
person of the violation. The penalties double for the second 30-day period, and 
continue to double for subsequent 30-day periods, up to $1 million per period 
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requirements for compliance with REMS, brand manufacturers are 
understandably concerned about their potential exposure.  
One commentator has raised concerns that brand manufacturers are 
selling drugs “to third parties who will conduct human trials over which 
the branded companies have no control. Third parties’ failure to follow 
the meticulous use provisions could result in liability litigation against 
the branded manufacturer.”223 Even limited studies need to ensure that 
the use of the drugs complies with REMS requirements and, absent a 
clear showing that they will be conducted safely and according to FDA 
standards, brand manufacturers raise valid questions regarding potential 
penalties. 
Absent a more persuasive plan for use of the drugs and general 
clarification from the FDA over compliance with REMS requirements, 
brand manufacturers have little proof that providing drug samples would 
not carry a risk of substantial sanctions; and they have little recourse to 
protect themselves against third-party actions. This explains why 
Actelion demanded reasonable assurances from the counterclaimants 
and the FDA that its REMS-restricted drugs would be administered in 
compliance with ETASU requirements.224  
2.  Products Liability: Recent Changes to Pharmaceutical Products 
Liability Law Imposed a Heightened Duty on Brand Manufacturers to 
Control and Safeguard Dangerous Drugs 
The state of brand-name and generic drug competition has recently 
taken a number of peculiar turns that appear perverse and shift heavy 
liabilities onto the brand manufacturer while at the same time insulating 
generic manufacturers from similar liability.225 The Supreme Court came 
to seemingly contradictory conclusions when it determined that people 
could sue brand manufacturers for failing to warn of potential risks on 
pharmaceutical labels in Wyeth v. Levine,226 but then found that victims 
                                                                                                                    
and $10 million per proceeding. 
Id. at 7. 
 223. Glenn G. Lammi, Is FTC Becoming an All-Purpose Health Care Cost Regulator?, 
FORBES (May 31, 2012, 1:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2012/05/31/is-ftc-
becoming-an-all-purpose-health-care-cost-regulator. 
 224. See supra Subsection I.C.2. 
 225. See, e.g., Lawrence O. Gostin, The FDA, Preemption, and Public Safety: 
Antiregulatory Effects and Maddening Inconsistency (Georgetown Public Law and Legal Theory 
Research, Paper No. 11-129, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1945985 (“Thus, in 
less than four years, the Court barred state health and safety litigation for FDA-approved medical 
devices, allowed failure-to-warn claims for branded pharmaceuticals, and then barred those same 
claims for generic pharmaceuticals.”). 
 226. 555 U.S. 555, 581 (2009). 
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of generic drugs could not sue the generic manufacturer because federal 
law preempted their tort claims in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing.227 The 
Court’s justification in Mensing was that although there should be a 
remedy against the generic manufacturer under state labeling laws, 
federal law required that generic labels be identical to the brand-name 
drug label and thus precluded a separate cause of action.228 The result is 
that brand manufacturers face substantially more tort liability for the 
manufacture and production of their products than generic manufacturers 
selling, by legal mandate, an identical product.229  
In some areas of the United States, legal liability has become even 
more confusing. In Conte v. Wyeth, Inc.,230 the California Court of 
Appeals held that a brand manufacturer has a duty of care that can lead 
to liability even when the patient has only taken the generic version of 
the drug.231 This is because the patient and doctor foreseeably rely on the 
product warnings of brand-name drugs regardless of which product is 
ultimately used to fill a prescription.232 In other words, the brand 
manufacturer can have substantial tort liability arising from errors, 
mistakes, or inconsistencies caused by its generic rivals.  
Some state courts have followed suit. The Supreme Court of Alabama 
held that brand manufacturers could be liable for fraudulent or 
misrepresentative statements made “in connection with the manufacture 
of a brand-name prescription drug” to a plaintiff only harmed by a 
generic version.233 This cause of action has become known as innovator 
                                                                                                                    
 227. 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2580–81 (2011), reh’g denied, 132 S. Ct. 55 (2011); see also Mut. 
Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2470 (2013) (extending Mensing and holding that “state-
law design-defect claims that turn on the adequacy of a drug’s warnings are pre-empted by 
federal law”). 
 228. See Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2572–74, 2581. 
 229. See, e.g., Gostin, supra note 225. 
 230. 168 Cal. App. 4th 89 (2008). 
 231. Id. at 114 (holding that “Wyeth’s common-law duty to use due care in formulating its 
product warnings extends to patients whose doctors foreseeably rely on its product information 
when prescribing [its brand-name drug] . . . whether the prescription is written for and/or filled 
with [the brand-name drug] or its generic equivalent”). For a more extensive discussion of the 
consequences of this decision, see Bridget M. Ahmann & Erin M. Verneris, Name Brand 
Exposure for Generic Drug Use: Prescription for Liability, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 767, 769 (2009). 
A similar unpublished decision issued from the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas. Id.; see 
Clark v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 1819, 2008 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 74 (Mar. 14, 2008). Nevertheless, 
most states continue to follow the more sensible rule from Foster v. American Home Products 
Corp. that liability only arises when the injured plaintiff can show that she took the defendant’s 
manufactured drug. See 29 F.3d 165, 170 (4th Cir. 1994); see also Brian Wolfman & Anne King, 
Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett and Its Implications, BLOOMBERG LAW (Oct. 21, 2013), 
http://www.bna.com/mutual-pharmaceutical-co-v-bartlett-and-its-implications/ (stating that 
most courts do not follow Conte and that “[t]he lead case is . . . Foster”).  
 232. Conte, 168 Cal. App. 4th at 94–95. 
 233. Wyeth, Inc. v. Weeks, No. 1101397, 2014 WL 4055813, at *22 (Ala. Aug. 15, 2014). 
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liability.234 A court in Vermont issued a similar ruling, holding that brand 
manufacturers have a duty to warn users of the generic versions of their 
drugs about potential side effects and risks.235 
Innovator liability does not only affect manufacturers of brand-name 
drugs while their patented products are in the market. Often, brand 
manufacturers abandon the production of certain pharmaceuticals after 
generic entry, because the drug’s resulting lower cost no longer justifies 
the manufacturer’s costs of production, distribution, and potential 
liability.236 Nevertheless, the brand manufacturer still may face liability 
for adverse events occurring from a generic drug that the brand 
manufacturer no longer produces or sells.237  
Brand manufacturers face additional possible lawsuits for millions or 
even billions of dollars in damages in class-action or mass-tort cases 
where generic versions of brand-name drugs caused injury either post-
release or during bioequivalence testing. Accordingly, brand 
manufacturers sometimes face a confusing landscape of liabilities for 
products they do not manufacture, for errors they did not cause, and for 
actions of companies they do not control. From a business standpoint, 
these liability issues are real, and giving drug samples to generic 
manufacturers provides absolutely no benefit to the brand manufacturer. 
So long as these liability issues remain murky, the possibility for severe 
financial consequences with no countervailing business-related benefits 
justifies a wide range of exclusionary behavior. 
                                                                                                                    
 234. The Threat of ‘Innovator Liability,’ WALL ST. J. (Mar. 13, 2013, 7:12 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323628804578346231780434760; see also 
Victor E. Schwartz et al., Warning: Shifting Liability to Manufacturers of Brand-Name 
Medicines When the Harm Was Allegedly Caused by Generic Drugs Has Severe Side Effects, 81 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1835, 1870–71 (2013) (“[Innovator] liability is certain to create new and 
significant financial pressures on brand-name drugs, the effects of which would harm health care 
consumers. . . . Ironically, some plaintiffs have argued that manufacturers of brand-name drugs 
can never escape competitor liability, even by withdrawing from the market, saying that the basis 
for liability can be the representations made when educating physicians about their drugs during 
the period of exclusivity. . . . [I]t will become riskier for brand-name manufacturers to dedicate 
resources to researching and developing potentially life-saving or life-improving medicines, 
particularly when those medicines have greater health risks or are for small communities of 
people that will not drive large revenues.”). 
 235. Kellogg v. Wyeth, 762 F. Supp. 2d 694, 709 (D. Vt. 2010). 
 236. See Schwartz et al., supra note 234, at 1870–71 (“[T]he fear of such liability would 
likely drive many brand-name manufacturers from a drug’s market once it becomes available in 
generic form. . . . Should the brand-name manufacturer prematurely withdraw from the market 
over liability, consumers will have lost the company most familiar with a medicine and the one 
that likely has the greatest infrastructure and resources to facilitate postmarket research and 
analysis into any late developing safety issues with a drug.”).  
 237. See id. at 1870 (discussing some plaintiffs’ argument that “manufacturers of brand-
name drugs can never escape competitor liability, even by withdrawing from the market”). 
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Brand manufacturers’ liability is the most outstanding issue and also 
the one Congress could most easily remedy; legislators could address the 
issue with a statutory liability shield to protect brand manufacturers from 
possible liability for generic drugs. The FDA could also take a more 
active role in clarifying these issues. Absent those actions, limiting the 
development of generics for the most dangerous drugs is necessary to 
avoid these likely liabilities and protect brand manufacturers from 
lawsuits. The ETASU restrictions are a signal that brand manufacturers 
need to tread lightly and ensure that they closely restrict and supervise 
any drug distribution. Generic alternatives represent a substantial risk for 
brand manufacturers and, thus, the brand manufacturers’ refusals to 
provide REMS-restricted drug samples represent another valid business 
justification. 
3.  Health and Safety: Generic Drugs Pose Potential Medical 
Risks to Patients and Reputational Harm to Brands 
Evidence is mounting that generic drugs may not always be as 
“identical” to the brand-name drug as the statutes require—something 
even the FDA has admitted in isolated cases.238 Some have speculated 
that generic drugs do not consistently perform as well as their brand 
counterparts and that these differences may pose acute health risks in 
certain drug categories or in certain high-risk patients.239  
Moreover, generic drug labels frequently differ from the brand-name 
labels. One study indicates that over two-thirds of generic labeling did 
not conform to the brand-name drug’s labeling, as regulations require.240 
Mislabeled drugs can pose severe health risks if the omission of 
contraindications, allergies, and side effects from the label causes 
                                                                                                                    
 238. See, e.g., Katie Thomas, An Increase in Scrutiny for Generics, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/01/business/fda-increases-scrutiny-of-some-generic-
drugs.html (“[T]he F.D.A. took the rare step of conducting its own study of the 300-milligram 
strength [after adverse reports started piling up on long-release versions of some generic drugs]. 
In early October, it announced that the drug did not, in fact, perform as well as the brand.”).  
 239. For an argument by one pharmacologist, Joe Graedon, see id. ( “[T]here’s still a cloud 
hanging over generic drugs . . . . This may be far more common than the F.D.A. had realized.”). 
 240. See Jon Duke, Jeff Friedlin & Xiaochun Li, Consistency in the Safety Labeling of 
Bioequivalent Medications, 22 PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGY & DRUG SAFETY 294 (2013), 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/pds.3351/pdf (noting that “68% of multi-
manufacturer drugs had discrepancies in ADR labeling” and that “[d]espite FDA mandate, 
bioequivalent drugs often differ in their safety labeling”); see also Emma Hitt, Safety Info for 
Generic Drugs Often Differs from Brand Label, MEDSCAPE MED. NEWS (Dec. 18, 2012), 
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/776347 (“Generic drugs often differ from brand name 
drugs in their safety labeling despite standards mandated by the [FDA] . . . .”). The extent of the 
health risks from this revelation is unclear, but mislabeled drugs certainly carry a heightened risk 
of being prescribed incorrectly. See id.  
34
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 3 [2016], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss3/3
2015] REMS-RESTRICTED DRUG DISTRIBUTION PROGRAMS 1011 
 
doctors to mistakenly prescribe drugs to vulnerable patients. The list of 
evidence and clinical trials revealing adverse effects and harmful 
medical results from generic substitution is growing. One study focusing 
on Narrow Therapeutic Index drugs (NTI drugs)—those with “small 
differences between therapeutic and toxic doses”—found that:  
there are patient safety concerns with [bioequivalence], 
especially for NTI drugs. NTI drugs have some challenges 
for clinical safety and efficacy when generic substitutions 
are introduced. From an economic perspective, the 
immediate cost savings of generic substitution for NTI 
drugs is not worth the cost of increased probability of 
hospitalization or adverse health effects.241 
Another study, which used a large Canadian dataset, found specific 
and acute health risks from a number of generic formulations including 
“increased seizure frequency, morbidity, and use of health care services, 
with a number of patients requiring a switch back to their previous 
formulation.”242 Although few studies have examined the subject thus 
far, there are other examples of health and safety risks posed by generic 
versions of brand-name drugs. 243 REMS-restricted drugs with ETASU 
are potentially dangerous drugs that pose valid safety concerns to 
patients.  
                                                                                                                    
 241. See Michelle Hottinger & Bryan A. Liang, Deficiencies of the FDA in Evaluating 
Generic Formulations: Addressing Narrow Therapeutic Index Drugs, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 667, 
669, 685 (2012).  
 242. Bernhard J. Steinhoff et al., Substitution of Anticonvulsant Drugs, 5 THERAPEUTICS & 
CLINICAL RISK MGMT. 449, 455 (2009), available at www.dovepress.com/getfile. 
php?fileID=4977 (including an additional reference to an investigation into antiepileptic drugs 
(AED), which found a “large body of unpublished, anecdotal evidence that substitution of 
[generic] AED formulations was associated with efficacy or safety issues . . . [and] was highly 
suggestive of a link between generic substitution and adverse effects”). 
 243. The American Academy of Neurology, which represents 19,000 neurologists, issued a 
position statement that “opposes generic substitution of anticonvulsant drugs for the treatment of 
epilepsy without the attending physician’s approval.” Position Statement on the Coverage of 
Anticonvulsant Drugs for the Treatment of Epilepsy, AM. ACAD. OF NEUROLOGY (Nov. 2006), 
https://www.aan.com/uploadedFiles/Website_Library_Assets/Documents/6.Public_Policy/1.St
ay_Informed/2.Position_statements/3.PDFs_of_all_Position_Statements/anticonv.pdf (noting 
that the FDA allows for significant variation between brand-name and generic drugs and that 
even small differences “can result in breakthrough seizures”). Some commentators have noted 
the differences between the FDA’s bioequivalence standard and therapeutic equivalence. See, 
e.g., Melissa Healy, FDA Standards Are Questioned, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2008), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/mar/17/health/he-genericside17 (“[T]he FDA permits a generic 
drug to release 80% to 125% of an active ingredient into the bloodstream . . . . [M]edical and 
pharmacology specialists warn that the FDA’s range may be too broad for some drugs, especially 
in cases where a drug has a ‘narrow therapeutic index’—the fine line between an ineffective dose 
and a dangerous one.”). 
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Adverse effects caused by differences in brand-name versus generic 
drugs can harm the reputation of the brand manufacturer despite lack of 
any fault. Consumers often do not distinguish between the brand name 
of a drug and the generic version, and will unjustly hold the brand 
manufacturer responsible for mistakes of the generic manufacturer.244 
Any difference between the brand and the generic may open the door to 
generic products liability, but adverse events arising from generic 
versions of brand-name drugs may have an equal or disproportionate 
impact on the reputation of the brand name, harming future sales and 
confidence in the brand manufacturer.245 
Two important aspects of any pharmaceutical business model are 
managing potential health and safety risks, and taking a precautionary 
approach by limiting the distribution of drug samples to medically 
approved practitioners. Accordingly, these health risks are a valid 
business justification for brand manufacturers’ refusal to deal with 
generic manufacturers.  
III.  ERROR COSTS AND ANTITRUST INTERVENTION  
The Supreme Court has recognized that business entities have a broad 
and robust right to refuse to deal with their rivals. This right comes from 
a strong concern about Type I errors246 and over-enforcement of the 
antitrust laws, which could lead to harmful legal rules that deter 
                                                                                                                    
 244. See generally Schwartz et al., supra note 234 (discussing court decisions related to 
brand manufacturer liability for mistakes of the generic manufacturer). 
 245. The relevant economic literature indicates that companies use brand names to 
differentiate their products and signal to consumers that they have invested in quality and 
excellence. See Benjamin Klein, Brand Names, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS 
42, 42–43 (3d ed. 2008). Consumers pay more for brands because the familiarity of the brand 
indicates consumer confidence in the product. See id. at 43 (“When it is difficult to determine 
the quality of a product before purchase and the consequences of poor quality are significant, it 
makes economic sense for consumers to rely on brand names and the company reputations 
associated with them. By paying more for a brand-name product in those circumstances, 
consumers are not acting irrationally. . . . A company’s high reputation indicates not only that 
the company has performed well in the past, but also that it will perform well in the future because 
it has an economic incentive to maintain and improve the quality of its products. A consumer 
who pays a high price for a brand-name product is paying for the assurance of increased 
quality.”). Consumers often have difficulty understanding the differences in pharmaceutical 
brand and generic versions and are confused about the way the entire industry works. See Carol 
Rados, Drug Name Confusion: Preventing Medication Errors, MEDICINENET.COM, 
http://www.medicinenet.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=53208 (last editorial review Nov. 
10, 2005) (indicating that confusion between different forms of drug names is common and 
sometimes causes serious side effects). 
 246. See Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, Innovation and the Limits of Antitrust, 6 
J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 153, 158–59 (2010) (describing Type I errors as false positives and 
Type II errors as false negatives). 
36
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 3 [2016], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss3/3
2015] REMS-RESTRICTED DRUG DISTRIBUTION PROGRAMS 1013 
 
procompetitive business behavior247—a major concern in REMS 
cases.248 Embedded in the principles of error costs is a concern that the 
realities of the competitive marketplace check the actions of monopolies 
and dominant firms, but poor legal rules that condemn or sanction 
procompetitive business behavior have no check.249 All things equal, the 
harms of the latter are greater than the harms of the former. Judge Frank 
Easterbrook expressed this theory in his article The Limits of Antitrust 
where he stated that: 
If the court errs by condemning a beneficial practice, the 
benefits may be lost for good. Any other firm that uses the 
condemned practice faces sanctions in the name of stare 
decisis, no matter the benefits. If the court errs by permitting 
a deleterious practice, though, the welfare loss decreases 
over time. Monopoly is self-destructive. Monopoly prices 
eventually attract entry. True, this long run may be a long 
time coming, . . . [b]ut this should not obscure the point: 
judicial errors that tolerate baleful practices are self-
correcting, while erroneous condemnations are not.250 
Viewed through the lens of the error-cost framework, antitrust 
intervention in the REMS context would be more costly to competition 
and consumer welfare than allowing market forces and existing 
regulatory oversight to settle the dispute. The likely decision-theoretic 
outcome and the correct presumption to apply in the case of forced 
sharing of REMS-restricted drugs is that antitrust intervention will be 
destructive for several reasons. First, a new exception to the refusal-to-
deal doctrine will adversely impact pharmaceutical market incentives 
and consumer welfare. Second, endorsing a new exception to the refusal-
to-deal doctrine will diverge from the antitrust presumption to avoid 
uncertainty and confusion in the marketplace. Third, existing FDA 
regulatory oversight precludes a policy supporting contradictory 
antitrust obligations.  
                                                                                                                    
 247. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 
414 (2004) (“Mistaken inferences and the resulting false condemnations ‘are especially costly, 
because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect.’ The cost of false 
positives counsels against an undue expansion of § 2 liability.” (citation omitted) (quoting 
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986))). 
 248. Some academics have acknowledged that Type I errors are an even bigger problem in 
innovation-type industries than in other cases. See Manne & Wright, supra note 246, at 164–66. 
“From an error-cost perspective, the fundamental problem is that economists have had a 
longstanding tendency to ascribe anticompetitive explanations to new forms of conduct that are 
not well understood.” Id. at 164. 
 249. See id. at 159 (discussing the connection between the error-cost framework and 
monopolization). 
 250. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1984). 
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A.  Generic Entry Jeopardizes Consumer Welfare and Patient 
Health Because of Reductions in Drug Capitalization, 
Communication, Marketing, and Reporting 
There is a general consensus in the literature that the overall price of 
a drug falls as generics enter the market. The benefits of generic 
competition to consumers are well-documented in terms of price,251 but 
other results are less clear. Much research finds that the price of brand-
name drugs may stay steady or increase after generic entry occurs.252 
This conclusion indicates that some consumers are infra-marginal and 
that, for many consumers, brand-name drugs are inelastic. Moreover, 
many studies find that the overall sales volume of combined generic and 
brand-name drugs typically falls steeply after the generics enter the 
market, likely because of reduced advertising and marketing.253 The 
implications of these facts are not to be understated. The FTC insists that 
generic entry is an unqualified benefit to consumers because of the cost 
savings of lower priced drugs, but consumer welfare is a calculus of 
price, output, and quality. Decreases in advertising and marketing 
indicate that the overall consumption of drugs and consumer access to 
pharmaceuticals may drop because of earlier generic entry.254 This drop 
                                                                                                                    
 251. This literature is extensive. See, e.g., Henry Grabowski & John Vernon, Longer Patents 
for Increased Generic Competition in the US: The Waxman-Hatch Act After One Decade, 10 
PHARMACOECONOMICS 110, 121 (1996), http://fds.duke.edu/db/attachment/467 (determining that 
the Hatch–Waxman Act has successfully encouraged generic-drug entry by changing the mix of 
generic integration from around 10% in the mid-1980s to nearly 40% in the mid-1990s).  
 252. See, e.g., Ernst R. Berndt, Margaret K. Kyle & Davina C. Ling, The Long Shadow of 
Patent Expiration: Generic Entry and Rx-to-OTC Switches, NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RESEARCH 
229, 249 (Jan. 2003), http://www.nber.org/chapters/c9737.pdf. 
 253. Empirical studies of the results of generic entry on market prices and overall quantity 
of drugs sold have found mixed results, but the general trend is that brands abandon advertising 
and marketing and that the amount of drugs sold decreases as generics enter the market. For an 
article highlighting case study evidence that this drop is likely related to decreases in brand 
manufacturer advertising and marketing of drug products, see Peter J. Huckfeldt & Christopher 
R. Knittel, Pharmaceutical Use Following Generic Entry: Paying Less and Buying Less 2–3 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17046, 2011), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w17046 (finding also that overall drug utilization rates drop two 
years before generic entry and continue to drop after entry occurs). Another paper similarly finds 
that generic entry leads to drops in advertising, marketing, and overall reductions in brand-name 
and generic drug sales. See Berndt, Kyle & Ling, supra note 252, at 244–51. Additionally, 
another paper finds that overall drug utilization and advertising decline after generic entry. See 
Richard E. Caves, Michael D. Whinston & Mark A. Hurwitz, Patent Expiration, Entry, and 
Competition in the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry, BROOKINGS PAPERS: MICROECONOMICS 26–
30, 37–42 (1991), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Projects/BPEA/1991%20micro/1991_ 
bpeamicro_caves.PDF (finding also that brand-name drug prices rise immediately before generic 
entry but then fall modestly after entry). 
 254. This issue is complicated because the use of more drugs is not always beneficial. 
Typically, classical economics regards output increases of any good as consumer welfare 
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in the quantity of sales, combined with the possible quality and efficacy 
issues discussed above, severely complicates the consumer welfare 
conclusions of the FTC. Lower prices are desirable, but drug utilization 
rates and access to the healthcare system may suffer. This implies that 
endorsing an antitrust rule that has, at best, ambiguous effects on 
consumer welfare is bad policy. 
Another important consideration is that the REMS restrictions, 
especially the ETASU, are applied only to drugs that require more 
careful distribution and use. Many of the REMS restrictions are focused 
closely on increasing communication and the dissemination of 
information between pharmaceutical companies, doctors, and 
patients.255 ETASU requirements focus on monitoring, reporting, and 
evaluating the use of dangerous drugs.256 These requirements share 
common themes of high costs and intensive labor. Generic 
manufacturers are often undercapitalized and may lack the resources to 
adequately implement the REMS restrictions.257 Doctors frequently 
complain about the lack of communication and involvement from 
generic manufacturers, and generic manufacturers almost never contact 
physicians in any capacity.258 A related concern is that the same federal 
preemption laws discussed above, which shield generic manufacturers 
                                                                                                                    
enhancing, but obviously drugs need to be prescribed accordingly by doctors. There is substantial 
academic literature on the issue of overmedication. See, e.g., Wim J. van der Steen, Assessing 
Overmedication: Biology, Philosophy and Common Sense, 51 ACTA BIOTHEORETICA 151 (2003), 
available at http://download.springer.com/static/pdf/372/art%253A10.1023%252FA% 
253A1025119821313.pdf?auth6=1421120696_feef85b00339b4b3dabd238ba3d124c6&ext=.pd
f (discussing the connection between overmedication and the pharmaceutical industry). This Article 
raises the issue merely to highlight that the consumer welfare effects are ambiguous, 
complicated, and not nearly as cut-and-dry as some might indicate. Nevertheless, a full 
discussion of the economics of pharmaceutical consumer welfare is beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
 255. Soller & Vogt, supra note 23. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Katie Thomas, Generic Drug Makers See a Drought Ahead, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/04/business/generic-drug-makers-facing-squeeze-on-
revenue.html (indicating that the initial “patent cliff” has dried up and that robust competition in 
the generic markets has severely limited profit margins, forcing generic manufacturers to either 
branch out into branded markets, specialize, or aim for larger international markets); see also 
William Hubbard, The Debilitating Effect of Exclusive Rights: Patents and Productive 
Inefficiency, 66 FLA. L. REV. 2045, 2046–47 (2014) (discussing other downfalls of the 
pharmaceutical industry and the harm this causes to cunsumers). 
 258. See LINDA L. BARRETT, AARP, PHYSICIANS’ ATTITUDES AND PRACTICES REGARDING 
GENERIC DRUGS 12 (2005), available at http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/health/phys_generic.pdf 
(“[R]epresentatives of generic drugs manufacturers are less likely to visit or dispense samples. 
Three in four (74 %) physicians say they or their practice has never been visited by a 
representative of a generic drug manufacturer and they are equally likely (76%) to say they have 
not received samples of generic drugs.”).  
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from tort liability, may also prevent the updating of drug labels to 
incorporate newly discovered health risks.259 This problem is enhanced 
when generic manufacturers are the sole source of many drugs because 
the branded version drops out of the market after generic entry makes 
participation unprofitable.260  
In the case of REMS with ETASU, the most dangerous drugs may go 
without adequate follow-up and evaluation if generic versions enter the 
market. Consequently, physicians might mishandle subsequent reports 
of adverse effects or prescribe drugs in instances that jeopardize patients’ 
health. Both possibilities, albeit hypothetical, should bear weight in the 
consideration of whether the refusal to provide drug samples is 
reasonable. Potential harm to consumer welfare from reduced utilization, 
decreased communication, and inadequate post-prescription review all 
justify brand manufacturers’ reluctance to aid in the development of 
generic alternatives. While the REMS restrictions are common among 
pharmaceuticals, the ETASU restrictions are limited to a small fraction 
of brand-name drugs and represent a rational regulatory response to 
dangerous side effects. Accelerating entry of generic versions 
jeopardizes the safe and effective administration of these restrictions.  
B.  A New Judicially Crafted Antitrust Exception Would Amplify 
Uncertainty over the REMS Program and Would Risk Depressing 
Pharmaceutical Investment 
The REMS restrictions are new and lack regulatory clarity, creating 
an environment where brand manufacturers are legitimately uncertain 
about their obligations and potential liabilities.261 Refusal to aid generic 
                                                                                                                    
 259. Inability of Generic Drug Manufacturers to Warn of Newly Discovered Hazards Puts 
Patients at Risk; Serious Safety Hazards Often Take Years to Emerge, PUBLIC CITIZEN (June 24, 
2013), http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/pressroomredirect.cfm?ID=3922 (quoting Dr. Michael 
Carome to emphasize that “[g]eneric drug manufacturers’ inability under current regulations to 
update the labeling of their products poses a threat to the safety of prescription drugs, creating 
unnecessary risks to patients”). 
 260. PUBLIC CITIZEN, GENERIC DRUG LABELING: A REPORT ON SERIOUS WARNINGS ADDED 
TO APPROVED DRUGS AND ON GENERIC DRUGS MARKETED WITHOUT A BRAND-NAME 
EQUIVALENT 1 (2013), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/2138.pdf (“For those 
drugs, patients and physicians cannot rely on the brand-name manufacturer to monitor reports of 
adverse effects and update the labeling.”).  
 261. See generally REMS: The New Reality, CAMPBELLALLIANCE, 
http://www.campbellalliance.com/articles/campbell_alliance_REMS_article.pdf (last visited 
May 1, 2015). This uncertainty is a common thread in all industry discussion of REMS. See, e.g., 
Jill Wechsler, REMS Raise Concerns for Biotech Products, BIOPHARMINTERNATIONAL (Apr. 1, 
2010), http://www.biopharminternational.com/node/221970 (noting that REMSs have created 
“uncertainty among manufacturers as to what information the agency wants, and when”) There 
have been substantial “delays in providing needed guidance for industry and in answering many 
questions about how to implement REMS procedures,” and “[a] main source of confusion for 
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entry for REMS-restricted drugs is a method of limiting this uncertainty.  
Uncertainty over REMS compliance is a major concern in the 
pharmaceutical industry. One medical contract research organization 
conducted a study of the REMS program and concluded that REMSs are 
“still an area of uncertainty, confusion, and concern for many 
sponsors.”262 Because of this uncertainty, the REMS programs are likely 
to be increasingly the target of pharmaceutical litigation, mass-tort cases, 
and potential class actions. The REMS and ETASU programs cover the 
most dangerous drugs on the market and thus will be connected to a 
disproportionate number of adverse events and lawsuits.  
Many specifics of the regulatory obligations and implementation of 
the REMS program remain murky. While compliance for one company 
is confusing, the joint-REMS requirements for drugs with both brand-
name and generic versions are also unclear. Expounding on these very 
issues, the brand manufacturer Prometheus Laboratories filed a citizen’s 
petition to the FDA asking for clarification.263 The citizen’s petition 
notes that: (1) the FDA’s single joint REMS program, which requires 
cooperation with any generic manufacturer, “will be scrutinized by the 
[FTC] for antitrust issues and likely the plaintiff’s bar in the context of 
product liability litigation” ; (2) many REMS program developments are 
costly and require substantial investment and there is no guidance on 
how those costs should be shared between the brand and generic 
manufacturers; and (3) there is no guidance on standards for how REMS 
programs should be “designed or modified after approval” because any 
agreement “will be subject to state court review in determining liability 
in a state tort failure to warn case.”264 The common theme of this 
complaint is that the FDA’s silence is creating a marketplace of 
uncertainty where liabilities, risks, and costs of the REMS program are 
high.265 This uncertainty in the pharmaceutical regulatory environment 
makes investment in the industry risky and less attractive to drug 
manufacturers. The likely result is depressed research and development 
budgets and reduced innovation—a socially harmful outcome.  
More clearly, should brand manufacturers be saddled with the 
affirmative duty to provide samples of REMS-restricted drugs to a 
generic competitor, there is a danger that research and development, as 
                                                                                                                    
manufacturers is when to start discussing the need for a REMS with the FDA and what kind of 
information the agency wants to see.” Id. 
 262. Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS) and the Impact on Opioid 
Analgesics, PREMIER RESEARCH, http://premier-research.com/images/uploads/REMS_White_ 
Paper_April_2010.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2015).  
 263. PROMETHEUS THERAPEUTICS, CITIZEN PETITION, No. FDA-2013-P-0572 (May 10, 
2013), available at http://freepdfhosting.com/6d7631c7c7.pdf [hereinafter PROMETHEUS CITIZEN 
PETITION]. 
 264. Id. at 11–12. 
 265. See id. at 7–8. 
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well as marketing of the drug, becomes unappealing to the brand 
manufacturer. The risks associated with providing the samples, or the 
costs associated with ensuring that the generic will properly handle the 
drug, may be too high to undertake. This, in turn, would remove the 
product from the market, and harm consumers by limiting their choices. 
Refusing to provide drug samples to generic manufacturers is, therefore, 
a reasonable means of controlling a brand manufacturer’s business 
calculus by avoiding the confusion of unclear joint REMS programs, and 
a reasonable step toward avoiding the uncertainty of managing REMS 
compliance where there are multiple actors.  
C.  Concern over Type I Errors and Conflicting Regulatory Regimes 
Necessitates a Presumption Against Antitrust Intervention 
Antitrust liability is not necessary in REMS cases because the 
Supreme Court in Trinko provided guidelines that limit the role of 
antitrust when there are alternative regulatory or statutory schemes 
involved.266 Congress often crafts policy goals that diverge substantially 
from those of the antitrust laws. When the statutory framework 
promoting these goals is clearly articulated and overseen by a regulatory 
agency, it should be generally assumed that the agency has the discretion 
and right to oversee its own statutory scheme—even if those outcomes 
diverge from the expectations of antitrust policy.267 This approach to 
antitrust law precludes the need for a new exception to the duty-to-deal 
jurisprudence.  
Trinko clearly establishes that violations of a regulatory scheme—the 
Telecommunications Act in that case—could not be the basis of an 
antitrust claim.268 Similarly, in the REMS context it is unlikely that a 
court would infer an antitrust violation from violations of the Hatch–
Waxman Act, the Leahy–Smith America Invents Act (the most recent 
Patent Act), or abuse of the FDAAA. It is also unclear whether brand 
manufacturers are in violation of any of those statutory schemes. 
Although the congressional language in the FDAAA mandates that 
brand manufacturers are not allowed to “block or delay approval” of 
ANDAs,269 the language does not impose a clear obligation to facilitate 
generic manufacture or provide samples. Congress and the FDA have 
had chances to change that language and, to date, have not done so.  
Additionally, this system is closely regulated and overseen by 
Congress, the FDA, and the Patent and Trademark Office. Congress has 
                                                                                                                    
 266. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 
412 (2004). 
 267. Id. at 412. 
 268. Id. at 415–16. 
 269. 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(f)(8) (2012). 
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entered the realm of healthcare legislation multiple times before and after 
passage of the Hatch–Waxman Act,270 which indicates that the current 
legislation is not a mere oversight. With a lack of a clear statutory duty 
and at least these three decision-making bodies involved in future 
regulation, the courts should feel safe that this is an area where antitrust 
is assuredly unnecessary to clarify parties’ obligations. Evidently, the 
FDA is the most appropriate agency with the most relevant knowledge 
to settle this dispute, and citizens’ petitions have requested that the FDA 
do just that.271 Accordingly, the court should make it clear that it has no 
role in this dispute and that the FTC has no authority to interpret 
congressional regulation of the pharmaceutical industry.  
Similar to the local exchange carrier in Trinko, brand manufacturers 
have no duty to deal with rivals. No persuasive case has been made that 
providing drug samples should be an exception to this rule. There are 
multiple extensive regulatory frameworks and federal agencies involved 
in overseeing the pharmaceutical industry, and generic manufacturers 
have a clearly defined administrative remedy that does not require the 
crafting of new antitrust liabilities; the available remedy is petitioning 
the FDA to commence an enforcement action.272 Given these facts, the 
standards from Trinko indicate that antitrust liability does not follow 
from a refusal to provide drug samples for bioequivalence testing.  
A more substantive application of existing refusal-to-deal 
jurisprudence indicates that there are many reasons to reject new antitrust 
obligations. Among others, there is no prior course of dealings between 
the brand and generic manufacturers because they are potential 
competitors. A prior course of dealing may provide a way to evaluate the 
potential economic harms or benefits resulting from conduct.273 Basic 
common sense indicates that generic entry will not benefit a brand 
manufacturer in the long run.274 While this lack of benefit does not 
excuse a brand manufacturer for restricting all sales to generics in all 
circumstances (e.g., when a drug is not REMS-restricted), it does support 
a policy of not establishing a new exception to the well-recognized 
competitor’s right to refuse to deal. To be sure, the FDA’s direct 
oversight of REMS-restricted drugs makes it unlikely that a brand 
manufacturer could easily establish REMSs for a drug to avoid 
                                                                                                                    
 270. See generally Natalie Pous, Shifting the Balance Between Branded and Generic 
Pharmaceutical Companies: Amendments to Hatch-Waxman Past, Present, and Future, 19 FED. 
CIR. B.J. 301 (2009) (discussing the Hatch–Waxman Act, its background, and the subsequent 
congressional attempts to amend it). 
 271. See, e.g., PROMETHEUS CITIZEN PETITION, supra note 263. 
 272. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2). 
 273. See supra note 173 and accompanying text. 
 274. See supra notes 251–54 and accompanying text.  
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distribution of samples to potential generic rivals. Also, the alleged 
behavior involves exclusion within the scope of a validly obtained patent 
in an industry where the patent structure is generally considered well 
implemented. A patent holder’s protection of her own intellectual 
property is generally considered a procompetitive justification for 
exclusionary conduct.275 Crafting antitrust exceptions to these well-
established rules carries a distinct possibility for overbroad applications 
beyond a narrowly tailored exception.  
Forcing a patent holder to participate in and expedite the entry of 
generic competition before the expiration of the patent date has the 
potential to decrease the length and value of pharmaceutical patents, 
which will deter investment and ultimately limit innovation industry-
wide. Again, case law is clear that absent exceptional circumstances 
there is no obligation to deal with rivals.276 An antitrust rule supporting 
the opposite proposition—introducing a new obligation to deal in the 
REMS context—might be broadly interpreted to limit the value and use 
of intellectual property when even the agencies have suggested that 
antitrust and IP “share the common purpose of promoting innovation and 
enhancing consumer welfare.”277 Relatedly and more importantly, 
forcing the patent holder to provide REMS-restricted drug samples to 
generic manufacturers risks harm to consumers: it reduces incentives for 
the brand manufacturer to provide the REMS-restricted drug in the first 
place because doing so would raise the brand manufacturer’s risk, and 
thus its operating costs, to a point of economic infeasibility.278  
Context for the Supreme Court’s approach to generic drugs, and how 
it might respond to brand manufacturers’ refusals to deal in the context 
of REMS-restricted drugs, can be extrapolated from the FTC v. Actavis, 
Inc.279 case where the competitive concerns of the pharmaceutical 
industry were most recently addressed.280 The Supreme Court evaluated 
a potentially collusive agreement where a generic manufacturer agreed 
to settle a Hatch–Waxman paragraph IV patent challenge with a brand-
name drug.281 The Court determined that the competitive concerns were 
                                                                                                                    
 275. See, e.g., Benjamin Klein & John Shepard Wiley Jr., Competitive Price Discrimination 
as an Antitrust Justification for Intellectual Property Refusals to Deal, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 599, 
600 (2003) (discussing “the Federal Circuit’s premise . . . that it is not necessary to undertake a 
fact-based inquiry into a patent holder’s business justifications for its refusal to deal”). 
 276. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408–09. 
 277. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE 
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 2 (1995).  
 278. See Henry Grabowski et al., Does Generic Entry Always Increase Consumer Welfare?, 
67 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 373, 384–85 (2012). 
 279. 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). 
 280. See id. at 2227. 
 281. Id. at 2227–29. 
44
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 3 [2016], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss3/3
2015] REMS-RESTRICTED DRUG DISTRIBUTION PROGRAMS 1021 
 
both exclusionary and collusive, as the settlement was potentially 
anticompetitive in preventing generic entry and deterring other generic 
challenges to the drug.282 Despite the FTC’s desire to apply a 
presumptively unlawful rule to these agreements, a rule that puts a thumb 
on the scale in favor of illegality, the Court held that reverse payments 
should be evaluated under the rule of reason.283 The presumption and 
development of antitrust law generally holds that agreements between 
competitors are more suspect than single-firm conduct.284  
Comparing these agreements to refusal-to-deal cases, a presumption 
arises from the nature of the basic conduct that a more stringent rule or 
condemnation from federal courts than the one applied in Actavis is 
unlikely. Although similar competitive concerns are at play, it is hard to 
find a refusal to sell a patented drug to a potential competitor who has 
no clear statutory right to access that intellectual property more suspect 
than an agreement between those competitors to avoid competition and 
share the resulting monopoly profits. The Actavis case is more like the 
latter situation than the former, although plenty of these settlements may 
be procompetitive or benign. A refusal to deal is certainly a more settled 
area of antitrust law, where the basic rule is that no obligation to deal 
exists.285 Refusals to cooperate are often telltale signs of fierce 
competition. The simple conclusion is that an agreement between 
competitors is far more likely to raise competitive concerns than a refusal 
to agree. If pay-for-delay cases receive the rule of reason, then a refusal to 
cooperate should likely be per se legal or analyzed under a searching inquiry 
similar to the rule of reason. 
Finally, the FTC’s amicus brief begs the question of why the FTC is 
involved in this case at all.286 The FTC brings less knowledge than the 
FDA to the areas of regulatory pharmaceutical policy, even if the 
Commission has prepared reports and studied competition including 
incentives in this area.287 The FTC seems to be grasping at proverbial 
section 2 straws with its antitrust arguments. The Commission even hit 
on the shortcomings of its own arguments when it pointed to language 
in Trinko stating that antitrust analysis should “reflect the distinctive 
economic and legal setting of the regulated industry to which it 
                                                                                                                    
 282. Id. at 2229. 
 283. Id. at 2236. 
 284. See, e.g., Terazosin Hydrochlorid Antitrust Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1313 (S.D. 
Fla. 2005). 
 285. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 597 
(1985). 
 286. See supra note 104. 
 287. FTC Actelion Brief, supra note 6, at 2–3. 
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applies.”288 The FTC attempted to argue that this language supported the 
idea that the pharmaceutical industry was designed to strongly support 
generic drug development,289 but it ignored the simple distinction that 
the pharmaceutical industry is already heavily regulated, is frequently 
directed by congressional legislation, and already functions efficiently 
without arbitrary antitrust liabilities. 
IV.  A SUGGESTED ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 
If the courts determine that antitrust analysis is appropriate, then 
refusals to deal in the REMS context should be evaluated under the 
profit-sacrifice test. This Part argues that although other theories of 
antitrust liability such as the essential-facilities doctrine or unfair 
methods of competition under section 5 of the FTC Act have been 
suggested as appropriate tools for addressing this conduct, courts should 
not adopt these frameworks.  
A.  The Profit-Sacrifice Test Is the Appropriate Antitrust 
Standard for Refusals to Provide Brand-Name Drug Samples to 
Generic Manufacturers  
Antitrust is rarely the answer in heavily regulated industries where an 
independent regulatory body or congressional action can obviate the 
need for an antitrust obligation or liability.290 Congress has had multiple 
chances to refine the language of the FDAAA and the FDA has had 
ample time to weigh in on and settle the issue. In the absence of action 
from either authority, it is imprudent to arbitrarily impose an antitrust 
obligation, as the FTC stated, merely because Congress “considered 
legislative proposals that would have created a more explicit statutory 
requirement.”291 Actions that Congress merely contemplated do not 
sway in favor of a statute’s interpretation. Even the FTC has admitted 
that Congress “has rejected proposals that would have provided for more 
explicit statutory obligations.”292 
Moreover, the FTC’s briefs ignore crucial comparisons that weigh 
strongly against imposing a new duty to deal. Although Trinko 
                                                                                                                    
 288. Id. at 17 (quoting Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 
540 U.S. 398, 411 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 289. Id. 
 290. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Innovation: Where We Are and Where We 
Should Be Going, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 749, 754 (2011). (“[A]ntitrust is not the exclusive protector 
of competition in innovation intensive markets. Many competition issues can be addressed more 
effectively through the IP statutes themselves, either alone or in addition to prudent application 
of the antitrust laws.”).  
 291. FTC Actelion Brief, supra note 6, at 15. 
 292. Id. at 16. 
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recognizes the language of Aspen Skiing that the right to refuse to deal is 
not “unqualified,”293 the remaining question is what the appropriate test 
is to determine the narrow exceptions to the right to refuse to deal.294 The 
intended manner of applying of section 2 remains unsettled, as nailing 
down the anticompetitive standard has proven difficult. This is because 
“the behavior at issue in cases alleging monopolization by exclusion of 
competitors necessarily will often be quite difficult to distinguish from 
the vigorous rivalry that antitrust law seeks to promote.”295 Nevertheless, 
should courts reach the merits of Actelion or other similar cases on a 
section 2 antitrust claim, the profit-sacrifice test is ultimately the 
appropriate standard for evaluating refusals to provide brand-name drug 
samples to generic manufacturers. As explained previously, under the 
profit-sacrifice test, conduct is anticompetitive only if the defendant has 
no legitimate business purpose for the conduct or it is unprofitable in the 
short run and makes business sense only if a rival is excluded, leaving 
the defendant with a supracompetitive recoupment in the long run.296 
The profit-sacrifice test “asks whether the conduct is profitable to the 
defendant in light of its (incremental) costs and . . . benefits” and 
“whether the conduct enabled the defendant to gain additional market 
power or a dangerous probability thereof.”297 Again, the test sets a high 
bar for finding a defendant liable for an antitrust violation. 
Although at least one prominent antitrust scholar has attacked the 
viability and usefulness of the profit-sacrifice test,298 this test is 
consistent with Otter Tail, Aspen Skiing, and Trinko and is the likely 
antitrust inquiry a court would make in these pharmaceutical cases. 
                                                                                                                    
 293. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 
(2004). 
 294. Trinko has also been affirmed and extended by Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. Linkline 
Communications, Inc., where the Court “reaffirmed the rights of parties to refuse to deal, saying 
further that the ‘instances in which a dominant firm may incur antitrust liability for purely 
unilateral conduct’ are ‘rare.’” Creighton & Jacobson, supra note 127, at 51 (quoting Pac. Bell 
Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 448 (2009)). 
 295. Susan A. Creighton et al., Cheap Exclusion, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 975, 978–79, 979 n.17 
(2005) (finding that any sophisticated analysis requires a careful balancing of Type I and Type 
II errors, with particular concern for avoiding false positives). 
 296. Melamed, supra note 172, at 389.  
 297. Id. at 389–90. 
 298. See Steven C. Salop, Exclusionary Conduct, Effect on Consumers, and the Flawed 
Profit-Sacrifice Standard, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 311, 326 (2006) (“[T]he analysis [is] circular and 
the standard an empty shell.”). Professor Steven Salop’s position hinges on the idea that this 
standard is complex and requires the court to perform predictive economics by constructing a 
hypothetical market and subjectively assessing “the defendant’s likely conduct in the 
hypothetical absence of an ability to raise prices.” Id. at 358. Professor Salop instead suggests a 
standard consumer-welfare test that inquires into legitimate business justifications of the alleged 
conduct and the effect such actions would have on consumers. Id.  
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Attorneys Susan Creighton and Jonathan Jacobson explain: 
In Otter Tail, the refusal to sell to rivals at the same price as 
the defendant was selling to everyone else was a distinction 
based solely on the character of the customer and was 
profitable only because of the negative effects on the 
customer-rivals. In Aspen [Skiing], the refusal to accept 
Highlands’ tickets at par or its cash-like vouchers was 
equally based solely on the character of the payer and 
otherwise made no sense. . . . Trinko involved no such facts, 
and that allowed the defendant to prevail. . . . No economic 
sense, then, was an important or controlling basis for 
illegality in Otter Tail [and] Aspen [Skiing]. . . and a 
decision that would make economic sense in a competitive 
market excused the denial of access in Trinko.299 
They conclude this discussion by noting that forcing a monopolist to 
provide access to its assets poses a threat to future investment in the 
industry and may harm consumer welfare in the long run.300 
The brand manufacturers’ refusals to provide REMS-restricted drug 
samples to generic manufacturers would survive the profit-sacrifice test. 
First, apart from a single and limited one-time sale of drug samples, 
brand manufacturers are not sacrificing any profits. There is no clear 
evidence of any economic harm, long-term or short-term, from the 
refusal to sell. The FTC brief latched onto the profit-sacrifice language 
from Aspen Skiing to argue three separate times that the refused drug 
sales would have been made at retail price and, thus, constitute a sacrifice 
of profits.301 At best, this argument is misleading. Although the generic 
manufacturers have offered to purchase the drug samples at full price, 
these requests are only for samples to conduct a single clinical study for 
bioequivalence testing. Although it is unclear exactly what sales volume 
this would constitute, in the context of a drug like Tracleer that sells over 
$1.5 billion annually,302 it is disingenuous to imply that the refusal to sell 
is sacrificing profits. The FTC’s argument relies on a de minimis 
                                                                                                                    
 299. Creighton & Jacobson, supra note 127, at 54. 
 300. Id. 
 301. The FTC argued that a brand manufacturer’s “refusal to sell to generic rivals may 
provide evidence of its willingness to sacrifice profitable sales.” FTC Actelion Brief, supra note 
6, at 12. It continued that the “generic firms’ allegations that they would be willing to compensate 
Actelion at full retail price support an inference, like in Aspen Skiing, that the refused sales would 
have been profitable.” Id. at 13–14. Finally, the FTC concludes that Actelion’s “refus[al] to 
provide access to its potential competitors, even if compensated at full retail price—support a 
viable theory of exclusionary conduct.” Id. at 14. 
 302. See, e.g., Jim Edwards, Cialis Goes up Against Viagra in Hypertension Add-On War, 
CBS MONEYWATCH (Aug. 18, 2009, 12:20 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/cialis-goes-up-
against-viagra-in-hypertension-add-on-war/. 
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standard that yields ridiculous results—a woman who throws a cup of 
water into the ocean and declares that there is now more water. The 
argument is technically true, but the exchange does not represent a 
significant sale or a major sacrifice of profits. The FTC even admits later 
in its brief that this is merely “a one-time sale of a limited quantity.”303 
Second, the determination of whether a certain sale constitutes 
sacrificing profits includes more consideration than merely the single 
transaction. In this case, the potential legal liability costs and the future 
costs of almost certain patent litigation can all be considered part of the 
costs of the sale of the drug. Both costs are substantial. As discussed 
above, generic drug versions expose brand manufacturers to innovator 
liability claims and common law negligence tort claims arising from 
incorrectly prescribed or mislabeled generic drugs.304 This liability can 
be massive and indicates that the costs associated with the sale of drug 
samples are far steeper than the profits made off a single, one-time sale. 
Another cost that must be included in the calculus of whether a sale is 
profitable is the resulting Hatch–Waxman litigation over the filing of a 
paragraph IV ANDA. By one measure, the average litigation costs of 
patent infringement cases could exceed $6 million.305 Some may argue 
that avoiding litigation costs of potential paragraph IV suits should not 
be analyzed as a measure to avoid profit losses but rather avoiding 
competition. Even ignoring potential paragraph IV suits, by any 
measure, the anticipated litigation costs faced by brand manufacturers 
forced to sell drug samples of REMS-restricted drugs are substantial. 
When factoring in the costs of research and development associated with 
creating a new drug and proceeding through the full NDA approval 
process, one concludes that the sales of these drug samples to generic 
manufacturers are not profitable and that no antitrust violation can be 
established on the basis of sacrificed profits.  
                                                                                                                    
 303. FTC Actelion Brief, supra note 6, at 15. 
 304. See supra notes 233–34 and accompanying text. 
 305. A 2009 survey by the American Intellectual Property Law Association estimated the 
size of attorneys’ fees in U.S. patent litigation, finding that “where the amount in dispute [was] 
between $1 million and $25 million, total litigation costs average in excess of $3 million.” See 
William R. Towns, U.S. Contingency Fees—A Level Playing Field?, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. 
MAG. 3 (Feb. 2010), available at http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/pdf/2010/ 
wipo_pub_121_2010_01.pdf. When the amount in dispute was higher than $25 million, the 
average litigation costs were around $6 million. See id. When the amount in dispute was lower 
than $1 million then often the costs of litigation exceeded the amount at stake. Id. at 4. Costs up 
to the end of discovery usually exceeded 60% of the amount in controversy. Id. This study was 
not specific to Hatch–Waxman pharmaceutical patent infringement cases, but, based on the size 
of known settlements in reverse payment cases, it can be inferred that they are typically even 
more costly than average patent litigation in the United States. It should not be controversial to 
conclude that the litigation costs are substantial. 
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Third, the patented products create the right to protect and exclude 
others from the brand-name drugs. Indeed, the FTC does note that the 
Hatch–Waxman Act exempts generic drug development from patent 
infringement, but infringement is not the issue in this case.306 Just 
because generic manufacturers can legally develop generics does not 
mean that brand manufacturers have to be complicit in the development 
of their own competition. Excluding others from the use of a patented 
product is exactly what a patent allows—so long as that exclusion is not 
solely for the purpose of harming competition.307 This right to exclude 
is certainly not unqualified, and the question for antitrust purposes is to 
ask why the exclusion is occurring. Theoretically, even under the profit-
sacrifice test, one could imagine a scenario where conduct could violate 
the antitrust laws. As mentioned previously, however, there is already a 
framework for oversight in place and any complaints about the 
regulatory process should be directed to the Patent and Trademark 
Office, the FDA, or Congress. Accordingly, following principles the 
Court espoused in Credit Suisse,308 applying the profit-sacrifice test 
ultimately does not weigh in favor of allowing antitrust liability in the 
REMS context, and any predicate antitrust claims should be rejected.  
B.  The Courts Should Reject Alternative Theories for Single-Firm 
Antitrust Liability 
Alternative theories for section 2 liability include application of the 
essential-facilities doctrine and encouraging the FTC to wield its section 
5 authority to bring cases under unique theories of consumer harm. As 
                                                                                                                    
 306. FTC Actelion Brief, supra note 6, at 5; see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2012). This has 
become known as the Bolar Amendment, which states that it is not  
an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the United States 
or import into the United States a patented invention . . . solely for uses 
reasonably related to the development and submission of information under a 
Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary 
biological products. 
Id. In Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., the Supreme Court found that the Bolar Amendment is 
notably confusing and that “[n]o interpretation we have been able to imagine can transform 
§ 271(e)(1) into an elegant piece of statutory draftsmanship.” 496 U.S. 661, 679 (1990). Section 
271(e)(2), however, “define[s] a new (and somewhat artificial) act of infringement for a very 
limited and technical purpose that relates only to certain drug applications,” which means that 
the filing of a paragraph IV certification can still be an infringement. Id. at 676.  
 307. See Darren S. Tucker et al, REMS: The Next Pharmaceutical Enforcement Priority?, 
28 ANTITRUST 74, 78 (2014) (noting that liability for mere refusals to license will not interfere 
with patent rights or antitrust protections). 
 308. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 285 (2007) (describing the 
four prongs of the Gordon test). 
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shown through discussion below, both approaches would lead to an 
injurious and confusing antitrust policy while relying on antiquated 
theories of consumer harm.  
1.  The Essential-Facilities Doctrine 
Although the FTC opted out of commenting on the doctrine,309 
generic manufacturers have argued that brand-name drug patents 
represent an essential facility.310 This doctrine arises from a series of 
district court cases, but the Supreme Court has neither adopted nor 
completely repudiated the doctrine.311 The premise is that a monopolist 
controls and can anticompetitively restrict the sole means of access to a 
competitive market.312 The essential-facilities doctrine finds liability for 
abuse of dominance where a monopolist holds a bottleneck control over 
a mandatory or required input or resource—a “facility”—necessary for 
market competition.313 That facility is usually in an upstream market and 
the doctrine requires that the facility cannot be duplicated.314 The 
doctrine states that in these circumstances the monopolist must share 
access.315 The patented drug could be characterized as an essential 
facility to competition in the pharmaceutical market for patients that 
need the drug.  
The essential-facilities doctrine has come under heavy scrutiny and 
criticism.316 Professors Phillip E. Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp 
originally suggested six limiting principles for the doctrine317 and have 
since concluded that “the essential facilit[ies] doctrine is both harmful 
                                                                                                                    
 309. See, e.g., FTC Mylan Brief, supra note 6, at 9 n.23. 
 310. See, e.g., Tucker et al., supra note 307, at 74. 
 311. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 
410–11 (2004). 
 312. One court divided the doctrine into a four-part test. Advanced Health-Care Serv., Inc. 
v. Radford Com. Hosp., 910 F.2d 139, 150 (4th Cir. 1990). The elements of the test included “(1) 
control of the essential facility by a monopolist; (2) a competitor’s inability practically or 
reasonably to duplicate the essential facility; (3) the denial of the use of the facility to a 
competitor; and (4) the feasibility of providing the facility to competitors.” Id. 
 313. See Tucker et al, supra note 307, at 74, 81 n.49 (citing MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T 
Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132 (7th Cir. 1983), superseded by statute, 47 U.S.C. § 152 (2012)). 
 314. See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FUNDAMENTALS OF ANTITRUST LAW 
§ 7.07[A], at 7-136–7-137 (4th ed. 2014). 
 315. See id. at 7-136.  
 316. See, e.g., Areeda, supra note 129, at 841 (“You will not find any case that provides a 
consistent rationale for the doctrine or that explores the social costs and benefits or the 
administrative costs of requiring the creator of an asset to share it with a rival. It is less a doctrine 
than an epithet . . . .”).  
 317. Id. at 852 (“Compulsory access, if it exists at all, is and should be very exceptional.”). 
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and unnecessary and should be abandoned.”318 The argument follows 
that a preferable antitrust inquiry will take a sufficiently focused look at 
the harms and benefits of an industry and the alleged anticompetitive 
conduct, which would sufficiently incorporate any aspects of limited 
access to a market. A separate essential-facilities doctrine is, thus, not 
required to evaluate the antitrust claims in any case.  
Even so, some application of the essential-facilities doctrine persists 
in the district courts,319 which necessitates a discussion of its application. 
The REMS-restricted drug patents should not qualify as essential 
facilities and, even if they did, the decision to restrict access is not 
anticompetitive under the remaining—albeit limited—essential-
facilities doctrine. There are three reasons for this conclusion. First, 
although the drug patents can confer some level of monopoly power, 
they are not essential facilities. This is because nothing is stopping 
generic manufacturers from developing their own brand-name drug for 
similar treatments to the drugs in question and undergoing the full NDA 
process. This process would not require samples of the patented drugs 
and, even if unlikely, would provide a path to future competition in the 
same market. Simply because generic pharmaceuticals are unlikely to 
take this path is irrelevant to the conclusion that a single patented drug 
is not an essential facility to a competitive market, and that other avenues 
exist to enter that market. Mere difficulty does not mean that a potential 
rival has been anticompetitively excluded from a market if other means 
of entry exist.320 
Second, courts applying the essential-facilities doctrine have focused 
intently on the competitive relationship between the parties. In 
Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp.,321 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit held that “there must be a market in which plaintiff and 
defendant compete, such that a monopolist extends its monopoly to the 
downstream market. . . . Absent such a relevant market and competitive 
relationship, the essential facility theory does not support a Sherman Act 
violation.”322 In these cases, the generic manufacturers are not yet 
competitors in the relevant market. Before becoming competitors, they 
                                                                                                                    
 318. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 314, § 7.07[C], at 7-140 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 319. See Tucker et al., supra note 307, at 74. 
 320. See, e.g., Mid-South Grizzlies v. Nat’l Football League, 550 F. Supp. 558, 569–70 
(E.D. Pa. 1982), aff’d, 720 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding where a non-professional football 
team was excluded from membership in the only professional league, that the league was not an 
essential facility because “[a]lthough not an easy task, plaintiffs are free to again attempt to form 
a rival football league”). The court also noted that others had attempted this feat before, meaning 
it was not infeasible. Id.  
 321. 195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 322. Id.at 1357. 
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would have to complete drug development, conduct bioequivalence 
testing, receive FDA approval for their ANDA, file a paragraph IV 
certification, and win a likely patent infringement suit. These are a large 
number of incomplete intervening events to being considered a 
competitor in the relevant market. At best, the generic manufacturers are 
merely potential future competitors and absent a stronger showing of 
exclusion, the essential-facilities doctrine cannot apply. Third, as 
discussed above, valid business justifications exist for the conduct of the 
brand manufacturers and insulate their decisions from scrutiny under the 
essential-facilities doctrine.323  
2.  Section 5 of the FTC Act: Unfair Methods of Competition 
The FTC is authorized under section 5 of the FTC Act to prosecute 
conduct that utilizes “[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting 
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”324 Although the 
history of section 5 has provided little explanation of the proper function 
of this right, current FTC commissioners have issued proposed policy 
statements seeking to elucidate the bounds of section 5.325 While these 
proposed statements certainly do not constitute formal guidance from the 
FTC, they provide some insight into how the agency conceptualizes its 
section 5 authority. The argument has been made that section 5 should 
be used to attack the brand manufacturers’ use of REMSs to exclude 
generic competition.326 However, based on the recent FTC guidance on 
section 5 and a sound approach to antitrust policy, these cases are not 
dealt with correctly under the FTC’s section 5 authority. Additionally, 
liability standards for “refusals to deal” in the REMS context have been 
the subject of considerable thought and discussion by courts of appeals 
and the Supreme Court; at least one court has declined to apply section 
5 policy in this context.327 
                                                                                                                    
 323. See supra Section III.B. 
 324. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012).  
 325. See, e.g., STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER JOSHUA D. WRIGHT, PROPOSED POLICY 
STATEMENT REGARDING UNFAIR METHODS OF COMPETITION UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE FEDERAL 
TRADE COMMISSION ACT, FED. TRADE COMM’N (June 19, 2013), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/wright/130619umcpolicystatement.pdf; see also Maureen K. 
Ohlhausen, Section 5 of the FTC Act: Principles of Navigation, J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 1 
(2013), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/ohlhausen/131018section5.pdf. 
 326. See, e.g., David A. Balto, Can Antitrust Laws Prevent Abuse of FDA Risk Programs?, 
LAW360 (Sept. 4, 2013, 12:36 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/468192 (“Section 5 can 
play a particularly important role in health care markets. Assuming the likely unfairness 
associated with brand-named manufacturers using REMS to prevent generic entry, the FTC 
should apply Section 5 to future cases.”). 
 327. One circuit court noted that section 5 should not be used in areas where there is “well-
forged” case law under the traditional antitrust laws because it might improperly blur the lines 
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First, although section 5 does extend beyond the bounds of the 
Sherman and Clayton Acts—as FTC Commissioner Joshua Wright has 
written—“the act or practice in question must result in, or likely result 
in, significant harm to competition as that term is understood under the 
traditional federal antitrust laws”328 and the conduct “must not generate 
cognizable efficiencies.”329 While this Article already addresses the 
relevant antitrust claims under the Sherman Act, Commissioner Wright 
points to two areas outside of traditional antitrust approaches that draw 
section 5 scrutiny: (1) invitations to collude, and (2) “unfair methods of 
competition to acquire market power that does not yet rise to the level of 
monopoly power necessary for a violation of the Sherman Act.”330 Only 
the latter example qualifies as a potential violation in the current REMS 
cases. Accordingly, the following analysis is confined to a discussion of 
potential anticompetitive harm and cognizable efficiencies.  
A violation of section 5 can most easily be established with “evidence 
that the challenged conduct has a harmful impact on price or output.”331 
The likely competitive effects of a refusal to sell drug samples to generic 
manufacturers have, at best, an ambiguous and unclear impact on output 
and price. The FTC would likely point to evidence of lower prices when 
generic competition occurs, but nearly all studies of post-generic entry 
pharmaceutical markets also indicate that drug utilization and industry 
output falls after generic entry.332 Any individual case would necessarily 
be fact-based, but a situation where certain conduct leads to lower prices 
and lower output could still have ambiguous competitive effects. 
Commissioner Maureen Ohlhausen has emphasized the need to provide 
clear guidance to businesses and the importance of reducing 
uncertainty.333 Bringing a standalone section 5 case against conduct that 
has vague competitive harm and has been approved by Supreme Court 
precedent—the refusal-to-deal doctrine334—under a Sherman Act claim, 
                                                                                                                    
between what is legal and what is illegal. See Rybnicek, supra note 167, at 2 n.2 (citing Boise 
Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 637 F.2d 573, 581–82 (9th Cir. 1980)); WRIGHT, supra note 325, at 6 
(“At the same time, the Commission will not challenge conduct as an unfair method of 
competition where there is well-forged case law under the traditional federal antitrust laws 
because the Commission does not have an institutional advantage in discerning competitive 
effects under such circumstances and prosecuting conduct under disparate standards may blur 
the line between lawful and unlawful behavior.”). 
 328. WRIGHT, supra note 325, at 5. 
 329. Id. at 9. 
 330. Id. at 8. 
 331. Id. at 7. 
 332. See supra note 253 and accompanying text. 
 333. Ohlhausen, supra note 325, at 9 (“[T]he agency should provide clear guidance and 
minimize the potential for uncertainty in the [unfair methods of competition] area.”). 
 334. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 
409 (2004) (noting that a refusal-to-deal case must fit within limited exceptions for the Court to 
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does not provide clear antitrust guidance and risks chilling 
procompetitive conduct.  
Finally, the refusal to provide drug samples to generic manufacturers 
raises cognizable efficiencies that insulate the behavior from 
condemnation under section 5. Cognizable efficiencies occur when there 
are “benefits that enhance consumer welfare [or 
generate] . . . . significant welfare gains for consumers.”335 As discussed 
previously, there are significant policy justifications for the refusal to 
deal.336 It would be unprecedented for a court to take a step that 
mandated cooperation with a competitor and also forced sharing of 
dangerous drugs that would end up being administered to humans while 
raising liability and potential health risks in consumers. The drugs 
covered by ETASU raise substantial health risks that cannot be 
adequately managed if generic versions are administered and the 
regulatory environment of REMS has fostered uncertainty in the 
marketplace that harms investment and research. Accordingly, these 
cases are poor candidates for a section 5 claim and would expand liability 
into an area previously untouched by antitrust, creating the very 
uncertainty and lack of clarity that the FTC professes to eschew.  
CONCLUSION 
Despite the FTC’s endorsement of antitrust claims for refusals to deal 
in the REMS context, antitrust law is not the solution to every dispute 
that arises between businesses. Antitrust law seeks to encourage a 
competitive market where firms are supposed to rigorously compete for 
advantages and profits. Competition often appears, at first glance, as 
predatory, exclusionary, or self-interested. That is exactly the situation 
that has arisen in the Actelion, Lannett, and Mylan cases, and in other 
examples of brand manufacturers refusing to provide samples of REMS-
restricted drugs to generic manufacturers for bioequivalence testing.  
Section 2 of the Sherman Act recognizes a strong right for dominant 
firms to refuse to deal with their rivals. Any exceptions to this rule must 
be well established in economic theory to benefit consumers, encourage 
competition, and avoid error costs. This scenario does not represent a 
good candidate for an exception to the right to refuse to deal. The effects 
of a duty to deal would be uncertain, and substantial harm to innovation 
and incentives for research and development would be at stake. The 
pharmaceutical industry is heavily regulated and has complex goals and 
statutory schemes. The proper remedy in this case comes from those bills 
and regulations overseen by Congress and the FDA. Imposing antitrust 
                                                                                                                    
hold a party liable). 
 335. WRIGHT, supra note 325, at 11. 
 336. See supra Part II. 
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liability would, instead, stifle competition and innovation. The FTC has 
done little to aid this process by contorting antitrust law to reach the exact 
opposite conclusion. Accordingly, district courts should be vigilant in 
recognizing that these cases are not the proper medium for an 
unprecedented expansion of section 2 antitrust liability.  
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